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MOTIVE, DUTY, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
RESTRICTED CHARITABLE GIFTS
John K Eason*

INTRODUCTION

Restricted charitable gifts present increasingly difficult
problems of compliance for the charitable recipient as time passes
from the date of the gift. A restricted charitable gift is a
contribution of money or property to charity with respect to which
the donor specifies certain terms and conditions that govern the
administration and application of the gifted assets.! In contrast to
restrictions that donors may place on gifts for private persons or
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law; Professor of Law,
Tulane Law School (2000-10); Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law (1999-2000). LL.M. (Taxation), University of Florida
College of Law, 1999; J.D. summa cum laude, Duke University School of Law,
1992; B.S. cum laude, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1989.
Formerly with the law firm of Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey &
Leonard, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina. Special thanks to David Brennan,
Evelyn Brody, Jill Manny, and Linda Sugin for the ideas and conversations
shared during conferences at New York University School of Law and Fordham
University School of Law in 2005 and 2007, respectively, which began my
thinking on the issues addressed here. Thanks also to my able research
assistants Phillip Childs, Lenea Goolsby, and Roy Sparks for their efforts in
exploring and documenting many of the issues discussed below.
1. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGs. § 400 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009) (noting that for charitable trusts, restricted gifts, and
conditional gifts, "a charity may not depart from or alter the terms of a gift
without following" certain legal procedures); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable
Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion over a
Charitable Corporation'sMission and UnrestrictedAssets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
689, 701 (2005) (contrasting restricted versus unrestricted gifts to charity). See
generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 400 & cmts. a-f
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (discussing charitable trusts and unrestricted,
restricted, and conditional gifts); Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts
Soar Above Twin Towers: A Federal Income Tax Solution to the Problem of

Publicly Solicited Surplus Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable
Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1838 (2003) (noting that a gift may be

deemed to be restricted based upon actions or representations of the charity
during the solicitation of the gift); John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual
Conditions in CharitableNaming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 375, 403-23 (2005) (discussing the property, trust, and contract
regimes sometimes invoked to explain the legal consequences attendant
restricted charitable gifts).
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uses, the law permits donor restrictions on charitable gifts to govern
forever.! The reason for this discrepancy is that gifts for charitable
purposes must by definition inure to the public good.3 Society has
thus struck a more conciliatory bargain with donors who contribute
their property in furtherance of such public purposes.
Societal
concessions to charitable donors, in other words, permit these
donors to exercise a degree of perpetual control over the use of
contributed property in ways otherwise foreclosed by law.
As the warm glow that originally accompanied a donor's
charitable gift begins to fade with time, however, the circumstances
and opportunities for public benefit that framed that gift also
inevitably evolve. Over time, the donor's restrictions may prove
difficult for the recipient organization's management to implement.
Those restrictions might also fall out of line with society's view of
acceptable charitable objectives.
A.

A Solution and Its Problems
The law provides a mechanism for addressing this seeming
impasse. That mechanism exists in the trust doctrine known as cy
2. As to the freedom granted donors in subjecting charitable gifts to
enduring restrictions, see, for example, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
explaining the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to charitable versus
noncharitable interests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. d (2003).
For a further discussion of dead-hand control over property and the trend
toward repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the context of private dynasty
trusts, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the
Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1985); Ira Mark Bloom, The GST
Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAx NOTES 569 (2000);
Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA

L. Rev. 1303, 1342-43 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).

3. Courts and commentators have generally acknowledged that no single
enumeration captures the universe of purposes that might qualify as
'charitable." See, e.g., Statute of Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 & 44 Eliz., c. 4
(Eng.) (enunciating a nonexclusive list of purposes thought to be charitable in
nature); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 551-56 (1867) (expounding
on the meaning of "charity" and "charitable" gift); Morice v. Bishop of Durham,
(1804) 9 Ves. Jun. 399, 404-06, 32 Eng. Rep. 656, 658-59 (Ch.) (applying the
Statute of Charitable Uses); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003)
(echoing the articulation set forth in the preamble to the Statute of Charitable
Uses).
4. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
1111, 1114-15 (1993). Professor Atkinson explains:
In exchange for perpetual donor control, society gets wealth devoted to
recognizably "public" purposes. Wealth that donors would otherwise
pass to individuals for "private" purposes is in a sense devoted to the
public domain. Thus the restraints the law allows to endure are not
wholly idiosyncratic; they must advance purposes that the courts, as
custodians of the commonweal, certify as publicly beneficial.
Id.
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pres. Cy pres doctrine empowers courts to modify or release donor
restrictions when compliance with those restrictions becomes
sufficiently problematic.!
Traditionally, when a court deems
compliance with the donor's terms to be "impossible, impracticable,
or illegal" and also finds the donor's charitable intentions to be more
general than specific, the court will "save" the gift by authorizing
utilization of the gifted property with some modification of the
donor's restrictive mandates.6
The risk that such modification might occur is in essence a price
the donor must pay should she desire to impose potentially
perpetual restrictions on the use of her gifted property.' A decidedly
pro-donor bias characterizes this bargain, however, because
invocation and application of cy pres doctrine turn in large part
upon what the court perceives to be the donor's intentions.
Discerning donor intent is a fact-specific and subjective inquiry, the
boundaries of which often grow exponentially when the alleged cy
pres circumstance arises many decades after delivery of the gift.
Judging present compliance (or the possibility of compliance) with
that intent is similarly prone to subjective judicial machinations. At
worst, cy pres doctrine inspires ends-oriented manipulation of the
analyses in order to rationalize outcomes. 9 Unfortunately, the
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 & cmts. a-f (2003) (setting
forth the requirements for and commentary pertaining to the doctrine of cy
pres); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 & cmts. a-r (1959) (same).
6. See infra Part I for a more detailed exposition of the requirements for
invocation of cy pres.
7. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of
Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAw. L.
REV. 353, 357 (1999) ("Under this normative theory, the settlor who establishes
a charitable trust is viewed as entering into a contract with the
public. . . pursuant to which the trust is given perpetual life in exchange for the
public's right to modify the trust terms, both substantive
and
administrative ...

.).

8. See, e.g., Loring v. Town of Kingsley (In re Loring's Estate), 175 P.2d
524, 531 (Cal. 1946) ("The cy pres doctrine has meant many things to many
courts and its limits have rarely been defined."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. ch. 4 introductory note at 4 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009)
("The longevity of the typical restriction argues for increased scrutiny-if not
skepticism--of assertions of what the donor intended."); Johnson, supra note 7,
at 383 ("[A]sking an interpreter who is extant in today's society whether [a longdead donor] had a general or specific intent ... is largely indeterminate.. . .").
9. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF NONPROFIT ORGS. reporter's
memorandum, at xxx (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("It appears that the courts
work backwards from the result they want ... ."); Rob Atkinson, The Low Road
to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice to Remove Dead Hand Control of
CharitableAssets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97, 139 (2007) ("All three [cy pres]
requirements are fact-specific and, therefore, subject to a measure of
manipulation in particular cases."); see also Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Say. Co.,
60 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 1945) ("[This court's cy pres decisions] have not been
free from contradiction and confusion."); infra note 102 (regarding the
sometimes questionable judicial invocation of the trust doctrine known as

HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 125 2010

126

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

malleability of cy pres doctrine too often leads to outcomes that fail
to predictably serve either donor intentions or society's interest in
the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the public."1
As a consequence, donors face uncertainty as to whether and to
what extent their specified restrictions will truly be honored and
enforced over time. Those charged with managing charitable
organizations likewise face uncertainty when a donor's terms
become problematic and the organization thus desires to depart
from those terms.
This uncertainty can inspire charitable
management to act unilaterally when restrictions become stale, and
perhaps long before such problems arise." Such unilateral actions
raise a host of issues, ranging from compliance with managerial
fiduciary duties to negative publicity that casts a pall over the entire
charitable sector with regard to gift solicitation and stewardship.
Recent treatments of cy pres doctrine, however, have held
firmly to the doctrine's trust-law origins.'
Such reform projects
generally tweak past doctrine, with some liberalization, in lieu of
providing practical guidance for an era of increasingly corporate
charitable governance.13 A current American Law Institute ("ALI")
equitable deviation where cy pres might otherwise produce a less-favored
result).
10. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?: The Search for
Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 41, 46 (1989) ("[Tlhe general intent requirement is not only unclear but
mischievous in its use to prevent the application of cy pres to save the original
gift [for application to charitable purposes]."); Vanessa Laird, Note, Phantom
Selves: The Search for a General CharitableIntent in the Application of the Cy
Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 977 (1988) (opining that the cy pres quest
as actually applied does little to further donors' intentions).
11. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 143-44. Professor Atkinson identifies
what he calls "charitable unilateralism" as a "low road" practical approach to
getting around dead-hand donor control. See id. at 141-44. "The first step [on
this 'low road'] is elegantly simple, if legally bold: JUST DO IT. Charitable
trustees ... would simply make the change they see fit, without bothering to
petition the relevant court under the doctrine of cy pres . . . ." Id. at 143.
12. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRuSTS § 67 (2003). For an overview of recent doctrinal liberalizations, see
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for GreaterAccountability of Nonprofit
Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 622-28 (2007).
13. "While we do not know how many charities today are trusts and how
many are corporations, the percentage of trusts is assumed to be small." Evelyn
Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 641, 641 n.1 (2005). Professor Brody goes on to approximate, based on
available Internal Revenue Service data pertaining to Internal Revenue Code
§ 501(c)(3) charitable organizations (excluding churches and private
foundations), that roughly 78% of these charitable organizations exist as
corporations, 19% as other forms of association, and 2% as charitable trusts.
See id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (identifying the types of organizations
eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions); JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN ScHwARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONs 69 (3d ed. 2006) ("The
predominant form of exempt organization in the United States is the nonprofit
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project to articulate the first Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations, on the other hand, takes a much more corporategovernance-oriented
approach
to
the broader
charitable
environment. 4 But even the clarity that the ALI project brings to
most issues seems less brilliant on matters pertaining to cy pres.1
The simple reason lies in the inherent difficulties of building on the
existing foundation of a flawed cy pres doctrine.
B.

A New Perspective
This Article casts off those constraints and provides a more solid
analytical foundation for dealing with donor-restricted gifts and the
difficulties such gifts cause when static donor directives confront
evolving societal needs and charitable objectives. Central to this
analysis is a new and fundamentally different way of understanding
donor intent when evaluating problematic gift restrictions. That
new perspective, in turn, supports this Article's radical recasting of
how decision makers should approach service to this foundational
donor-intent notion, both in the context of cy pres adjudications and
in relation to the restricted-gift management that precedes
invocation of that remedial doctrine.
More specifically, Part I of this Article explains current cy pres
doctrine and the circumstances to which it applies.
That
explanation includes a brief exposition of the doctrine's
shortcomings, both as observed by scholars over many decades and
as affecting the actions of charitable management. Part II then
focuses on the role played by charitable management in stewarding
donor-restricted gifts. Following this discussion, Part III introduces
a new way of evaluating donor intent, the resulting gift restrictions,
and the entitlement of both to perpetual adherence.
As explained in Parts IV through VII, this evaluation flows from
a meaningfully different conception of donor intent in the context of
corporation."); id. at 68 (noting the historically "checkered existence" of the
charitable trust in the United States). See generally id. at 320-27, 349-53
(explaining charitable organizations as a subset of the larger nonprofit and taxexempt arena, and also discussing charitable organizations and their available
organizational forms in terms of federal tax laws).
14. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGs. reporter's
memorandum, at xxvii-xxix (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). For background on
this project, see American Law Institute, Current Projects: Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organizations, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=projects.proj_ip&projectid=3 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) ("This project aims to
draft legal principles for the nonprofit sector, including principles relating to
governance and to the duties of governing boards and individual fiduciaries.").
15. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2009). Much of the clarity provided under the ALI project actually
derives from provisions that do not set forth the cy pres doctrine itself. See, e.g.,
id. § 430 ("Compliance with Terms of a Trust or Gift Instrument"); id. § 440
("Effects of the Passage of Time"); id. §450 ("Procedures when Circumstances
Require Modification of a Trust or Gift Instrument").
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restricted charitable gifts and cy pres doctrine. That conception
derives in part from the answer to a seemingly simple question: why
do donors, generally, impose restrictions on gifts in lieu of simply
donating that property outright and without restrictions? Departing
from the subjective inquiries underlying traditional cy pres doctrine
and proceeding by reference to more objective consequences, four
donor motivations in particular rise to the fore. Specifically, donors
impose restrictions in order (1) to support the donor's belief in
worthy charitable objectives and the causes best suited to
accomplishing those objectives; (2) to constrain charitable
management from straying from the donor's own view of what are,
or how to accomplish, those charitable objectives; (3) to freeze in
place the donor's individual notions of appropriate but evolving
public policy; and (4) quite simply, to exercise and enjoy a significant
power that society has chosen to bestow on donors through the law
of charitable gifts.
As Parts IV through VII demonstrate, the noted motivations
find their origin in a broad view of the objective consequences of
donor restrictions. As a result, the overall approach suggested here
provides a more sound analytical structure than current cy pres
doctrine on at least three fronts. First, the proposed analysis
employs a more predictable framework for ascertaining the donor's
preferred charitable purpose when circumstances have allegedly
changed. Second, the approach here provides both practical and
normative insights on those of the donor's restrictions that can, and
should, be honored going forward. Third, in a significant departure
from current doctrine, this Article's suggested analytical approach
establishes a paradigm by reference to which charitable
management should be inclined to act in administering donorrestricted gifts, long before any cy pres circumstance arises.
I. CY PRES DOCTRINE EXPLAINED
Cy pres is the legal doctrine designed to address donor
restrictions that have become sufficiently difficult to implement or
that allegedly fail to serve society's now-evolved view of an
acceptable charitable purpose. 16 Problematic donor restrictions that
might give rise to cy pres analysis include, for example, a provision
restricting the use of gifted funds to the treatment of a disease that
has since been eradicated or an earlier-era scholarship fund that is
permeated with the donor's now-decried racial bias. In such
circumstances, a court might invoke cy pres to authorize the
application of the contributed property to the treatment of another
disease or to scholarships unencumbered by discriminatory
preferences. 17 If cy pres applies, a court can thus "save" the
16.
17.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmts. a, c (2003).
See Atkinson, supra note 4, at 1117-18.
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charitable nature of the donor's contribution by directing its
application to alternative but more currently achievable charitable
uses.
More accurately stated, however, cy pres doctrine has
traditionally emphasized honoring and preserving donor intent
whether or not it entails continuation of the gift in some charitable
form.' The desired outcome from a societal perspective-at best a
corollary to this concern for donor intent-is the retention of the
gifted property in the stream of charitable commerce for application
in pursuit of benefits that accrue to the public." Notwithstanding
this societal goal, ultimately, perpetuation of the donor's intentions
guides current doctrine.2 o If narrowly expressed, those donor
intentions can defeat the applicability of cy pres and therefore
defeat any alternative use of the property in further pursuit of
charitable ends.
18. See Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 305-10

(1939) (exploring the history of cy pres as an intent-effectuating doctrine); see
also C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres:A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407 (1979)

(discussing historical aspects of cy pres doctrine as an intent-guided
undertaking); Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You:
Robertson v. Princeton Provides Liberal-DemocraticInsights into the Dilemma

of Cy Pres Reform, 51 AuZ. L. REV. 75, 102 (2009) ("At the end of the day, the
doctrine of cy pres is a saving device and what is saved is donor intent.").
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmts. a-b (2003).
20. The classic conflict posits on one side a preference for subjecting
property to the will of the living, who presumptively will seek to apply that
property to its highest, best, and most currently relevant or "efficient" use. On
the other side is an argument often couched in terms of individual liberty, or
more specifically, respect for an individual's freedom to dictate the terms upon
which that individual chooses to part with her property. See id. § 29 reporter's
notes cmts. f-h (discussing this dead-hand debate and citing various
authorities).
21. Absent application of cy pres, the gift will simply fail, and the gifted
assets will either revert to the donor's heirs or pass according to such
alternative plan as the donor may have specified. Importantly, a donor may
specify an alternative gift over to another charitable beneficiary. In that case,
the property can remain in service to charitable ends notwithstanding the
failure of the donor's original terms. See, e.g., id. § 67 cmt. b (discussing the
impact of donor specification of alternative beneficiaries); Chester, supra note
10, at 44-47 (same). A donor-specified gift over to an alternative charitable
beneficiary is actually a very desirable gift structure from both a donor and
societal standpoint. From society's standpoint, such instructions leave the
property in charitable hands. From the donor's perspective, such a gift
indicates that the donor thought beyond her original gift and indicated to future
trustees her intentions in the event of changed circumstances, such that her
intentions can continue to affect the gift. Benefits accrue to both the donor and
society in that naming an alternative charitable beneficiary provides an
otherwise-lacking enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with donor
intent. See generally Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary

Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 96-97 (2008) (proposing an alternative gift-enforcement
regime whereby charities are monitored by charities); Eason, supra note 1, at
433-36 (discussing gifts over to alternative charitable beneficiaries as an
enforcement mechanism). An alternative beneficiary would, among other
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A.

DoctrinalRequirements
The application of cy pres is therefore far from automatic and
turns upon satisfaction of several criteria. As a preliminary matter,
the donor must have intended her gift to be both subject to limiting
restrictions and in furtherance of purposes that in fact qualify as
charitable. These requirements cause few problems today and can
be met regardless of whether the gift is made to a charitable trust or
corporation. 3 Following these preliminary findings, however, the
advantages, have standing to initiate a cy pres proceeding to force the recipient

charity to either comply with the donor's terms or forfeit the gift. See Evelyn
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of CharitableDonor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1187, 1191 (2007).
22. Regarding the requirement of donor-imposed limiting restrictions,
typically expressed as impressing the gifted assets with a "trust," and the need
for the gift to be charitable in nature, see, for example, RONALD CHESTER,
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, SECTIONS 411-470, § 431 (3d ed. 2005).

23. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 371 ("[Courts] typically construe the
'charitable purpose' requirement liberally and . .. [it] rarely has prevented the
application of the cy pres doctrine."). As to trusts and corporations, cy pres
doctrine is often stated in terms of a donor's intent to create a charitable trust.
This "trust" reference refers most basically to the donor's wish to impose
binding restrictions as opposed to merely stating some precatory desires. See
supra note 22. A gift given to a charitable corporation and subject to donorimposed restrictions on the use of the assets is generally deemed to be held "in
trust" by the corporation-meaning, at least, that the corporation has a duty to
abide by the donor's directives, subject to cy pres modification. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 413 cmt. (amended 2005) ("The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to
trusts, but also to other types of charitable dispositions, including those to
charitable corporations."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 400
reporter's note 4 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("The treatment of restricted
gifts to corporate charities varies in theory among the states, but not in effect.
Regardless of whether the state treats a restricted gift as a charitable trust, the
charity has a general duty to adhere to the restriction."); id. § 460 cmt. a
("[Clourts and legislatures have transported these trust-law savings devices to

allow for modification of restricted gifts not made in trust."); id. § 460 reporter's

note 10 ("[Clourts commonly apply these trust doctrines to restricted gifts made
to charitable corporations."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003)
(explaining that a contribution of property to a charitable organization that is
restricted to a particular purpose is generally regarded as creating a charitable
trust, regardless of whether the recipient organization is organized as a trust or
a corporation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959) ("[The
doctrine of cy pres] is peculiar to charitable trusts and charitable
corporations ... ."); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 127 ("If property is
given for a particular charitable purpose and the [recipient] corporation
dissolves or changes its purposes . . . [t]he more restrictive common law cy pres
or deviation [trust] doctrines will apply and the property will pass to a
charitable corporation that meets those stricter standards."); IARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 438 (2004) ("The
doctrine of cy pres [is] applicable ... in forty-nine states to charitable trusts and
to charitable corporations. . . ."); 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTrr & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS

§ 348.1 (4th ed. 1989) (explaining the

extent to which trust principles are applicable to charitable corporations). See
generally infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction
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exploration of donor intent becomes more exacting and its
implications for case outcomes more variable. In this regard, three
additional analytical steps affect whether and how the doctrine
applies.
1. Frustration
First, cy pres traditionally applies only where it has become
"impossible, impracticable, or illegal" to carry out the donor's
original charitable purpose.'
Such a determination depends not
only upon the court's understanding of exactly what charitable
purpose a given donor intended, but also upon a court's willingness
to find that purpose sufficiently frustrated. 25 As to the degree of
frustration required, both commentators and the practicing bar have
noted "significant" variability in judicial attitudes toward finding
that one of these triggering circumstances exists.26 Many see a
of corporate-governance and charitable-trust law).
24. A traditional statement of the doctrine, offered by the Restatement
(Second)of Trusts, provides:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or
illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor
manifested a more general intention to devote the property to
charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the
application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls
within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). More recent articulations of
the doctrine have added the impediment of a purpose becoming "wasteful" to
the circumstances that justify application of the doctrine, though that criterion
had generally been rejected under prior law as too liberal. See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 413(a) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003), In
part because of that resistance, the "wasteful" criterion remains decidedly more
limited (if even accepted at all in a given jurisdiction) than common usage of the
term might suggest. The Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
describes "wasteful" as meaning that the funds dedicated to a given purpose far
exceed that which is necessary, such that it would be imprudent not to expand
the purposes for which the funds can be applied. See id. § 67 cmt. c(1) ("The
term 'wasteful' is used here neither in the sense of common-law waste nor to
suggest that a lesser standard of merely 'better use' will suffice."); cf UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 413(a) cmt. (amended 2005) (expressing a similar sentiment).
25. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 372 ("This ['impossible,
impracticable, or illegal'] prong requires a fact-specific inquiry, and the courts'
refusal to construe this requirement liberally has caused it to become the major
impediment to the application of the cy pres doctrine .... " (footnote call number
omitted)); see also Chester, supra note 18, at 408 ("[U]nder the guise of two of
the primary requirements for modification of trusts through cy pres, dead hand
control [is] still . .. a reality in the 1970's. [One of these requirements is] that
the specific intent of the donor has become impractical or impossible of
performance.").
26. See Comm. on Charitable Trusts & Founds., Am. Bar Ass'n, Cy Pres
and Deviation: Current Trends in Application, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 391,
392 (1973) ("[Tlhere continues to be a significant variance in the degree of
impossibility or impracticability required."); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking

HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 131 2010

132

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

"prevailing conservative [udicial] mood," suggesting a narrow view
toward the application of cy pres to modify gift terms." As one
commentator recently noted:
"[lillegality" as a criterion of relief.. . is applied almost
entirely to defeat restrictions that are discriminatory ....
... Relief on grounds of "impossibility" is typically granted
only where subject funds remain, but the cause to which funds
are to be applied has ceased to exist. That is to say, .. . where
the social object of the grant has altogether ceased to
exist . . .. The criterion of "impracticality" then effectively

dissolves into "impossibility," with courts unwilling to exploit
the category otherwise."
This narrow judicial approach evokes criticism on two closely
related fronts. First, it makes it less likely that the doctrine will be
invoked such that modification of the donor's terms can be had. In
other words, many commentators object to a narrow judicial
construction that allows these triggering criteria to serve a stringent
"gatekeeping" function on the availability of cy pres relief.29 That
gatekeeping exists, of course, in order to forestall modification of
often-outdated donor terms and thus to preserve donor intent as
understood by the court. The second criticism, perhaps better stated
as the logical consequence of this protection of donor intent, is that
the noted criteria in application place too little emphasis on the
"continued social efficacy" of the donor's restrictive terms.
the Perpetual Nature of ConservationEasements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421,
466 (2005) (concluding that three decades after the ABA study, "this state of
affairs does not appear to have changed"); see also id. at 465 ("Decisions
regarding whether the charitable purpose of a gift or trust has become
'impossible or impracticable' are based on the particular facts of each case, and
no precise definition of the standard exists.").
27. McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 467; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (discussing the
traditional legal principles governing restricted charitable gifts and noting that
"[tihe inherently conservative nature of this legal structure is controversial");
Goodwin, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that the "impossibility" and
"impracticability" criteria "afford relief only under very limited circumstances");
Johnson, supra note 7, at 371 ("Most courts have been unwilling to abandon the
rigidly textual approach employed when analyzing the ['impossible,
impracticable, or illegal'] prong ... ."); Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the
Dead Hand's Grip: CharitableEfficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L.
REV. 635, 643-44 (1988) (making the same observation).
28. Goodwin, supra note 18, at 101.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. Goodwin, supra note 18, at 101-02 ("The cy pres doctrine harbors no
criterion by which to evaluate the continued social efficacy of a
nondiscriminatory restricted gift short of a showing that its object has ceased to
exist."); see also Chester, supra note 18, at 408, 419 (indicating that the
"impossibility" criterion represents a key deferral to donor intent over societal
concerns); Sisson, supra note 27, at 648-53 (arguing for more expansive
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2. CharitableIntent
Even if a court finds impossibility or one of the other triggering
frustrations to exist, cy pres will only apply if the court finds that a
second criterion has also been met. That criterion requires the
donor to have acted with "general charitable intent" when making
the gift.n To find such intent, the court must discern that the
donor's original intentions were sufficiently broad in nature.
Specifically, the donor's intentions must have been broad enough to
transcend absolute adherence to the very particular restrictions that
the donor placed on the use of the gifted assets now that current
circumstances frustrate compliance with those restrictions.
A
donor, alternatively, possessed a more confining, "specific" intent if
she would have preferred that her charitable designs simply
terminate if they could no longer be carried out precisely as
originally contemplated."
Upon finding general charitable intent, the court will "save" the
charitable essence of the gift by relaxing the donor's restrictions.
This permits the gifted property to be applied in pursuit of a
charitable purpose that in some way reflects the donor's originally
restricted purpose.3 If a court finds that a donor acted with only
specific charitable intentions, however, cy pres doctrine will not
apply and the gift will fail.
B.

Variability and Reform Efforts

Before considering the third aspect of cy pres analysis, a few
observations are in order. Specifically, the "impossibility" threshold,
the general-intent requirement, and their consequent impact on cy
pres analysis and outcomes conspire to impair cy pres doctrine's
applicability of cy pres in cases short of impossibility).
31. See supra note 24 (providing a traditional statement of cy pres doctrinal
requirements); see also infra Part I.B (addressing recent liberalizations of cy
pres doctrine, particularly with regard to the general-intent requirement).
32. CHEsTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 436; ScoTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 23, § 399.
33. Stated differently, courts will attribute general intent to a donor if her
mindset at the time of the gift is deemed to be such that, upon confronting the
failure of her expressed charitable designs, the donor would have wanted her
gifted property to be dedicated to some similar charitable purpose-even if
doing so requires a departure from the specifies of her expressed restrictions.
See ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 399.2; see also Craft v. Shroyer, 74
N.E.2d 589, 593-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (discussing the general-intent
requirement); Atkinson, supra note 4, at 1117-18 (discussing this requirement
and what it means in terms of a donor's desired course of action where the
original charitable objective fails); Laird, supra note 10, at 978 (reducing the
inquiry to ascertaining which of two outcomes the donor would have preferred).
34. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009) ("[Clourts developed mechanisms under charitable-trust law
to 'save' the settlor's charitable wishes by modifying the trust in a manner that
furthers the settlor's intent.").
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ability to provide a truly workable and predictable basis for decision
making. The general-intent requirement, in particular, has been
roundly criticized by scholars as a "legal fiction" 5 that prevents even
'diligent' judges" 36 from applying cy pres in any consistent or
predictable manner."
Indeed, even the Reporter of the recent
Restatement (Third) of Trusts describes the general-intent inquiry
as "artificial and speculative." Such criticisms obtain because any
inquiry into a given donor's intentions is necessarily subjective and
fact-specific."
Even courts acknowledge the limited value of
precedent-apart, of course, from demonstrating the lack of
consistency in outcomes under the doctrine. 0 These observations
lead to the basic conclusion that, with respect to inquiries into the
scope of a donor's charitable intentions, "courts have no principled
basis for the application of the cy pres doctrine."
A doctrine as consequential as cy pres can only be left to
languish for so long under standards that essentially invite an ex
post facto explanation of donor intent in order to support the
outcome for which rationalization is sought. That rationalization, of
course, is that a given gift either is or is not sufficiently frustrated or
that continuation under modified terms was or was not within the

35. Terri R. Reicher, Assuring Competent Oversight to Hospital Conversion
Transactions, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 83, 129 (2000).
36. Laird, supra note 10, at 977.
37. See, e.g., Loring v. Town of Kingsley (In re Loring's Estate), 175 P.2d
524, 531 (Cal. 1946) ("The cy pres doctrine has meant many things to many
courts and its limits have rarely been defined."); Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Say.
Co., 60 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 1945) ("[This court's cy pres decisions] have not
been free from contradiction and confusion.").
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 reporter's notes cmt. b (2003)
("Much criticism has focused on the artificial and speculative inquiry whether a
settlor had a 'general' charitable intent. . . .").
39. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Atkinson, supra note
9, at 139 ("All three [cy pres] requirements are fact-specific and, therefore,
subject to a measure of manipulation in particular cases."); Laird, supra note
10, at 977 (opining that the general-intent requirement as applied does little to
further donor's intentions).
40. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church, Reidsville, N.C., 284
N.C. 284, 300, 200 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1973) ("[N]o two cases are exactly alike ....
Consequently, it is not possible to reconcile all of the decisions of the various
courts, even where the circumstances are quite similar."); Craft v. Shroyer, 74
N.E.2d 589, 595 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) ("It will serve no useful purpose to discuss
at length the numerous cases ... in which the cy pres doctrine has been
invoked."); supra note 37. Demonstrative of the strength of this criticism is
Professor Bogert's observation that "[dlirectly opposite results in cases where
the facts are similar prove the unsatisfactory nature of the search for the
settlor's intent." CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 436. Courts
have acknowledged this reality by noting, for example, that a "line of
demarkation [between specific and general intent] is not wel defined" and that
a "research of authorities does not disclose any particular tests which have been
applied." Craft, 74 N.E.2d at 593.
41. Johnson, supra note 7, at 380.
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donor's contemplation. A partial solution for this artifice appears in
the recently promulgated Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") and its
fraternal sibling, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. Both efforts to
improve cy pres doctrine state that general charitable intent should
be presumed.4 2
The old rules nevertheless resurface, as that
presumption may then be rebutted by evidence of a more specific
donor intention."
Notwithstanding the rebuttable presumption,
moreover, the court must in all instances still decide exactly what
purposes a given donor intended before the accomplishment of such
purposes can be declared "impossible, impracticable, or illegal."4 So
third-party declarations about the scope of an individual donor's
subjective intent still permeate cy pres outcomes, even under the
most current attempts to reform the doctrine.
The rebuttable presumption of general charitable intent does
represent an improvement in cy pres doctrine, particularly if the
revision is readily adopted by the states.45 But as one commentator
recently observed, "[e]ven as the need to free up charitable assets
has increased dramatically, reform has moved glacially; in some
places, indeed, dead hand control seems to have frozen still more
In any event, the proposed revisions fail to
solidly in place."4
42. See UNIF. TRuST CODE § 413 cmt. (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 67 cmt. b (2003).
43. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003). The UTC goes a step further by expressly
rejecting gifts over to noncharitable beneficiaries if more than twenty-one years
have elapsed since the date of the gift, unless the gift over is in the form of a
reversion to a still-living donor. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (amended
2005); cf. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 440 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2009) ("[Alfter the passage of a significant period of time . .. the policy of
adhering to the terms in the .. . gift instrument increasingly weakens . . . .").
44. With regard to reform efforts and the adoption of a "wasteful" trigger
for cy pres relief, see supranote 24.
45. But cf PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 reporter's
notes 15-16 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (explaining that "[niot all states are

so liberal" as to adopt wholeheartedly the UTC's version of the related
equitable-deviation doctrine and also noting that some states that have adopted
the UTC have nonetheless "continued their prior cy pres standard instead of
enacting the uniform provision"); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle,
or What Comes Around Goes Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 730 (2007)
(discussing the high-profile dispute between Princeton University and the
Robertson family over Princeton's management of a restricted charitable gift
from the family and noting that neither of the states whose laws were
potentially applicable to that dispute had enacted the UTC or affirmatively
embraced the cy pres liberalizations found in the Restatement (Third)).
46. Atkinson, supra note 9, at 101. Professor Atkinson also notes "the
disappointing progress of dead hand reform." Id. at 106. For a recent judicial
decision turning upon the general or specific nature of a donor's intent, see
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University, No. M2008-00723COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2047376 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009), which involved
Fisk University's plan to sell a portion of the art collection donated to the
university by Georgia O'Keeffe. The court concluded: "We ... reverse the trial
court's finding that the gifts to the University were motivated by a specific
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provide a panacea for all that ails traditional cy pres doctrine in
practical application .47
This is particularly so in light of the
increasingly corporate context in which restricted-gift problems
48
arise.
However, this recommended presumption of general charitable
intent does suggest an important ideal reflected in the analysis
presented below-namely, the appropriateness in cy pres analysis of
ascribing to donors, as a class, some broadly conceived charitable
inclination underlying any restricted gift.
The UTC and
Restatement (Third)position, in other words, provides some support
for this Article's argument, which considers the charitable
inclinations of donors generally rather than fixating on the very
subjective intentions of a given donor. But alas, such foreshadowing
requires further explanation, and placing that explanation in the
proper context requires that the task at hand be completed first.
Thus, the final task here is to appreciate the third element of cy pres
analysis.
C.

A Third Cy Pres Variable
Once past the "impossibility, impracticability, or illegality" and
general-charitable-intent issues, courts confront a third task that
effectively keeps open the door to a range of possible outcomes.
Specifically, the court must determine an alternative charitable use
for the donor's gift that is, under the traditional rubric, "as near as
possible" to the use intended by the donor.4 9 Reform projects have
taken a more liberal stance by permitting the gifted property to be
used "in a manner consistent with" or that "reasonably
In view of the
approximates" the donor's charitable intent.50
safeguarding of donor intent seen thus far, it is somewhat
paradoxical that this ultimate exercise of judicial authority
essentially leaves the court with a theoretically guided, but in many
charitable intent instead of a general charitable intent, [and therefore we
reverse] the finding that the University cannot establish that it is entitled to cy
pres relief." Id. at *16.
47. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 18, at 110 ("These attempts at reform
notwithstanding, the age-old cy pres doctrine remains largely intact, still
offering no relief to charities with endowed projects and programs burdened by
time and changed circumstances (except where the mission is determined
impossible to achieve whatever the efforts of the charity).").
48. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II
(examining the management of restricted charitable assets by recipient
organizations and including a discussion of the interaction between the trustbased cy pres doctrine and modem corporate governance).
49. See CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 22, § 431. This idea
reflects the origins of the term "cy pres," which is a shortened form of "cy pres
comme possible," which translated from Norman French means "as near as
possible." Id.
50. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT
(TMRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
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practical respects free, hand to direct application of the contributed
property in any number of divergent ways once cy pres is deemed to
apply. The speculative evaluation (or unrebutted presumption) of
"general charitable intent" opens the judicial-reformation door to an
expansive view of just what that general intent entailed and where
its parameters lie, and outcomes proceed from there."'
Suppose, for example, that in 1940 a donor devised funds to City
Hospital for the establishment and support of a wing to house and
care for tuberculosis patients. Tuberculosis patients today almost
universally receive outpatient treatment, with hospital stays
unnecessary and, indeed, often unavailable. Given the absence of
any need for tuberculosis beds in a modem American hospital (i.e.,
impossibility/impracticability), and given the malleability of the
general-charitable-intent inquiry, a court (if so inclined) could easily
find this gift subject to modification under the doctrine of cy pres."2
But to what modified use? The court would have little difficulty
justifying application of the funds to support the operation of a
tuberculosis outpatient clinic or perhaps to fund a hospital wing to
care for patients of a modern affliction that is similar to 1940s
tuberculosis in prevalence, effect, or treatment. If City Hospital
lacks a tuberculosis outpatient facility or the ability to treat a
modem tuberculosis equivalent, the court could justifiably direct
that the funds be transferred to an adjacent community's hospital
for the indicated uses, or, harking back to the general-charitableintent criterion (whether direct or by way of rebuttal), the court
could simply declare that the donor specifically intended the funds
to be used only in the City Hospital community. The court could
then conclude that the gift fails altogether and reverts to the donor's
heirs. Better for the charity (City Hospital) petitioning for cy pres
relief, the court could just as easily opine that by virtue of her
general intent, the donor would have wanted the funds to be applied
in support of City Hospital's general operations without regard to
the treatment of tuberculosis or any other disease. And who is to
say, today, exactly what the donor would have really wanted or
which outcomes truly reflect the donor's subjective desires? In any
51. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("In framing cy pres relief, the court, purportingto
determine what the settlor or donor would have wanted, traditionally departed
as minimally as possible from the original instructions
RESTATEmENT (THIRD)

OF TRUSTS

..

. ." (emphasis added));

§ 67 cmt. d (2003) ("[Slettlors' probable

preferences are almost inevitably a matter of speculation.. . ."); McLaughlin,
supra note 26, at 485 ("In formulating a substitute plan, courts consider ... the
same type of evidence the courts examine in determining whether the donor
had a general, as opposed to specific, charitable intent.").
52. For discussion of cy pres in the context of gifts for the treatment of
tuberculosis, see Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin,
and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 1, 73 n.269 (2005); John F. Kuether, Significant Probate and Trust
Decisions, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. &TR. J. 645, 693-94 (1996).
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event, the range of possible outcomes is quite varied, and in many
cases, a singularly principled basis for decision making or predicting
outcomes is lacking.
D.

Summary
Ultimately, the doctrine of cy pres leaves much to be desired in
terms of certainty, consistency, principled decision making, and
sufficient regard for the continuing social efficacy of the donor's
particular directives. As noted, cy pres is in fact a doctrine that
fundamentally "demands a return to the mind of the [donor]."" This
explains why many courts construe the criteria for invoking the
doctrine narrowly so as to make it difficult even to consider
upsetting the donor's intent; why a finding of general charitable
intent is then required (or must withstand rebuttal) before the
doctrine can be applied; and even when these requirements are
satisfied, why the ultimate doctrinal objective is to authorize an
alternative charitable use that conforms in some way to the donor's
often unknowable intentions. Of course, these observations address
doctrinal matters. A more comprehensive view of restricted gifts
and the potentially pernicious effects of traditional cy pres doctrine,
however, requires a more thorough understanding of the problems
that restricted charitable gifts often present for charitable
organizational management. Part II addresses these issues.
II. MANAGING RESTRICTED CHARITABLE ASSETS
An appeal to cy pres doctrine represents only the final act in the

life of a charitable organization's dealings with donor-restricted
gifts. In this regard, three stages characterize the life of a restricted
charitable gift, and cy pres and its potential modification of donor
terms appear last (if at all) in that cycle. 4 The first stage in this
restricted-gift life cycle encompasses the negotiation and
procurement of the gift. During this "origination" stage, the donor
and recipient organization might agree on certain terms and
restrictions that will guide the organization's use of the gifted
assets." Alternatively, a donor may simply impose such restrictions
53. Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and
the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1145, 1197 (2003); see
supra notes 8-10, 18 and accompanying text; supra Part I.A.2.
54. See Eason, supra note 45, at 696-97 (explaining the life cycle of a
restricted charitable gift), quoted in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.
§ 440 reporter's note 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). The discussion in this
Part draws from and expands upon Eason, supra note 45.
55. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. ch. 4 introductory note
at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("[Nlegotiating with a potential major
benefactor over restrictions and conditions can be delicate and troubling for
charity management and boards... ."); id. § 430 cmt. b(2) (discussing giftacceptance policies); see also Eason, supra note 45, at 707-08 (discussing
professional and ethical standards applicable to the negotiation and acceptance

HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 138 2010

2010]

RESTRICTED CHARITABLE GIFTS

139

unilaterally-as in the case of a restricted charitable devise set forth
in a donor's will.
Where a restricted charitable gift results, the second
("managerial") stage consists of that period during which the
recipient organization's management endeavors to employ the gifted
assets in furtherance of the organization's charitable mission. This
stage could theoretically endure forever, were gift restrictions
presciently crafted, circumstances unyieldingly stable, or donors
conciliatory by expressly granting discretion to charitable
management to deal with inevitable change. As a practical matter,
however, charitable management will at some point likely confront
(or at least perceive) a need to depart from a given donor's particular
gift restrictions. Such a "cy pres circumstance" could signal the
third stage in the life of the gift, that period during which a
problematic restriction is debated and ultimately modified by a
court or upheld such that the recipient organization must forfeit the
gifted property due to its inability to adhere to the donor's terms.
Petitioning a court for cy pres relief is a clear option when
management faces difficult issues of compliance with a donor's
terms. Charitable management, however, faces a dilemma more
complicated than simply evaluating the time and expense of seeking
judicial relief. The noted unpredictability of cy pres outcomes
coupled with the fiduciary duties governing managerial conduct fuel
this dilemma and often forestall any formal transition to the cy pres
stage in the life of a particular gift.5 More specifically, management
must constantly balance its obligation to efficiently and effectively
pursue the organization's charitable mission against restricted-gift
terms that may in fact or perception impede that pursuit. The
dilemma, then, lies in management's task of determining whether
and to what extent a donor's restrictive terms have become
problematic in light of this mission, and if so, determining the best
way to remedy the problem.
The particular path that management chooses to follow out of
(or better yet, around) this dilemma has significant implications for
the reality of honoring a donor's intent. The very existence of the
dilemma, moreover, poses a normative problem that is exacerbated
by the flaws in current cy pres doctrine. After first providing a brief
explanation of the fiduciary duties governing management's
stewardship of donor-restricted gifts, the discussion in this Part will
of charitable gifts).

56. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (noting that a gift instrument may itself authorize
modification).
57. See, e.g., Eason, supra note 45, at 730-32 (discussing the Robertson v.
Princeton University litigation and evaluating why Princeton may have resisted
invoking the doctrine of cy pres despite the university's allegations that
circumstances had changed since the date of the gift); see also Goodwin, supra
note 18, at 85-86 (echoing these observations about Robertson).
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turn to the dilemma, its consequences, and considerations that
exacerbate both.
FiduciaryDuties
The fiduciary duties that bind charitable management prescribe
a minimal level of active integrity and competence in managerial
conduct and decision making. Those duties include a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty." The duty of care relates to the competence
displayed by management in carrying out its responsibilities.
Commentators variously describe the duty as requiring that
management be diligent and attentive, that decisions be informed,
and that actions be carried out in good faith and with ordinary
prudence.59 Except in cases of egregious negligence, compliance
with these duty-of-care responsibilities typically turns upon matters
of process rather than the substantive merits of the actual decisions
made.60 Assume, for example, that a donor contributed funds
expressly "to facilitate the construction of a new state-of-the-art
athletic arena for Private University." In that case, the duty of care
would require, among other things, that management duly
investigate facility costs and specifications, compare features at
other modern facilities to gauge "state-of-the-art," consider the
feasibility of an on-campus versus an off-campus location, and
evaluate the number and types of sports teams that might utilize
the new facility.
The duty of loyalty, by contrast, requires faithful pursuit of the
interests and charitable mission of the organization.' Pursuit of the
self-interest of the decision maker or other interests external to the
organization's charitable objectives would violate the duty.62 So

A.

58. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 149-216. The parameters of
the duties of care and loyalty are set forth in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 300, 310, 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). For various
standards of conduct as articulated in state statutes and elsewhere, see id.
§ 300 reporter's notes 6-14.
59. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 315 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2007); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 23, at 199-215.
60. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 893,

908-13 (2007) (discussing the duty of care in the context of the best-judgment
rule and contrasting that to a standard that evaluates the substantive merits of
management decisions); see also DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR
NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 49-59 (1988) (discussing the business-judgment rule).
61. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 310 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007).
62. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 310 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
It usually would not make a legal difference whether duties are owed

to the charitable purpose (the trust approach) or to the entity itself
(the corporate approach). In either case, the charity's board members
must carry out that purpose in the exercise of their discretion, subject
to any restriction imposed by the settlor or donors. By using the

HeinOnline -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 140 2010

2010]

RESTRICTED CHARITABLE GIFTS

141

continuing the previous example, management would violate its
duty of loyalty if it were to choose a building site or contractor based
upon potential personal gains flowing from the decision. Were an
organization to accept a gift of land in order to appease a major
donor, knowing that the land is difficult or costly to maintain and
ill-suited for the athletic-facility uses to which the donor restricted
it, this could also implicate a breach of the managerial duty of
loyalty."
Within these parameters, charitable corporate management
enjoys a degree of autonomy in decision making that is fairly broad.
As in the case of the standards governing conduct of for-profit
corporate management, the oft-cited concepts of good faith,
diligence, and faithful pursuit of the organization's mission
constrain such decision making and provide standards for judging
compliance when challenges arise.6
In the foregoing example,
management could decide to build an on-campus facility even
though an off-campus site might cost less and offer other
advantages. Such a decision might be based upon the perceived
(and duly considered) benefits to students or perhaps some notion
that the integration into campus of a new facility will enhance
campus life or attract more skilled athletic recruits than would a
more impersonal off-campus site. So long as management reached
this decision after reasonable investigation, unbiased by personal or
other extraneous concerns, a court would have little difficulty
upholding management's actions were a challenge to arise-and
management should feel confident in so proceeding. In short,
charitable management is vested with a recognizable degree of
discretion in making decisions relevant to the organization's
operations and pursuits.
B.

The Fuzzy Middle Ground

Where a restricted charitable gift is involved, however, an
additional obligation constrains management. This obligation has
roots in the long-accepted trust-law principle that a trustee must
"administer a trust in a manner faithful to the wishes of the
phrase "best interests of the charity, in light of its stated purposes,"
this Section combines the trust and corporate language to declare an
affirmative obligation of the fiduciaries to govern for charitable
purposes, and not for the benefit of board members, executives,
donors, or other private parties.

Id.
63. The donor, for example, may enjoy significant tax benefits or a naming
opportunity from the transaction, which the board could be loathe to deny the
donor based on a past and expected future of generous giving to the institution.
See generally supra note 55 (discussing the negotiation and acceptance of
charitable gifts as well as applicable professional and ethical standards).
64. For a good discussion of good faith, loyalty, and duty to mission-as
well as the problems with such standards-see Sugin, supra note 60, at 908-13.
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creator." 65 Significantly, the more exacting standards of trust law
govern restricted charitable gifts and adherence to this "duty of
obedience," regardless of whether the charitable recipient exists as a
nonprofit corporation or a straightforward trust.66 Those trust
standards require strict compliance with the donor's terms, without
regard to whether ordinary prudence and good faith (duty of care) or
a lack of self-interest (duty of loyalty) accompany any failed attempt
to comply. 67 If departure from a donor's terms is desired, the
organization's management would be compelled to seek judicial
approval for modification or release of the restrictions under the
trust doctrine of cy pres. 6 Management would be "compelled" both
65. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 219 (citing 2A SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 23, § 164.1 (4th ed. 1987)); see also Sugin, supra note 60,

at 898.
66. See supra note 23. "Duty of obedience" as used here signals only an
obligation pertaining to gift restrictions that arise other than by virtue of a
charitable corporation's organizational charter and bylaws. Under "the most
robust version of the duty [of obedience]," by contrast, the board must adhere to
the purposes stated in the charitable corporation's original incorporating
documents absent circumstances akin to those required to initiate a cy pres
action. Katz, supra note 1, at 700; see also KURTZ, supra note 60, at 85.

In

Kurtz's view, this duty would regard the organization's corporate purposes, as
set forth in the organizational charter, as constituting express terms upon
which all gifts to the corporation are conditioned. See id. at 85-86. Most
commentators (including this author) reject the existence of such an expansive
duty tied to the mere choice of organizational form. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra

note 23, at 225-26; Sugin, supra note 60, at 902 (offering instead a more
"abstract" duty of "fidelity"); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT
ORGs. § 240 cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) (rejecting a separate duty of
obedience, "at least as it has been interpreted to prevent a board ... of a
nonprofit corporation from altering corporate purposes prospectively"); FISHMAN
& SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 219 (describing the duty of obedience as
"somewhat less recognized"); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary
Law, 57 MD. L. REv. 1400, 1406 n.30 (1998). See generally Atkinson, supra note
21, at 47-54 (discussing the duty of obedience in relation to and as possibly
subsumed by or augmenting the duties of care and loyalty).
67. Professor Sugin argues that properly understood, the duty of obedience
goes beyond the standards of care and loyalty by imposing a substantive
obligation of fidelity to mission, regardless of procedure or any lack of selfinterest. See Sugin, supra note 60, at 908-13.
68. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 & cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT

ORGs. § 240 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("[Tlhis Section confines the
obligation to seek judicial relief to the trustees of charitable trusts with respect
to all restrictions, and to the boards of directors of nonprofit corporations only
with respect to restricted charitable gifts (and not to all assets of the
corporation)... ."). This discussion assumes the absence of some release
provision in the gift instrument or a donor release under section 7(a) of the 1972
Uniform Management of InstitutionalFunds Act ("UMIFA") or section 6(a) of its
2006 revision, the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

("UPMIFA"). For a discussion of UMIFA and UPMIFA, see Susan N. Gary,
Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management

of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277 (2007).
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because it lacks autonomy to make such changes on its own accord
and because a charity's governing board has a duty to keep gifted
funds productive for the benefit of the charitable class served by the
*69
organization.
Thus, when charitable management confronts the prospect of
deviating from a donor's restrictions, management lacks the
autonomy typically associated with "corporate" governance.o Such
autonomy might otherwise permit management to identify other,
more currently relevant purposes or means of operation and then to
make a unilateral decision about how best to redeploy the gifted
Charitable fiduciaries
assets in light of those opportunities.
ground when it
middle
in
a
fuzzy
therefore often find themselves
of gifted assets
applications
certain
comes to determining whether
thus within
restrictions-and
fall within the parameters of a donor's
judicial
whether
the purview of managerial discretion-or
authorization for such applications might be required.
The net result is that many situations arguably fitting the cy
pres mold first give rise to an interesting interplay between the
corporate managerial duties of care and loyalty and their attendant
discretion on the one hand and the strict trust-law duty of obedience
on the other hand. Grounded as it is in trust law, cy pres doctrine
exists to resolve problems that arise from duty-of-obedience
difficulties. The doctrine does so, however, without due regard for or
effect on the duties of care and loyalty in the modern charitable

69. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009) ("[IUt is incumbent upon the charity's fiduciaries to ensure
that its assets are productively used... . Thus, if a term in a trust or a gift
instrument cannot be complied with, application of this Section [dealing with
modification procedures] is mandatory."); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 23, at
225-26, 439.
70. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("[TIhe standards of fiduciary performance for
trustees have been conforming to the [more liberal] nonprofit corporate
standards, in recognition of the level of discretion needed to govern an operating
charity; at the same time, however, the requirements for performance of
restrictions on gifts by corporate fiduciaries have been conforming to the
[generally stricter standards of] trust law."); Katz, supra note 1, at 696 ("As
compared to charitable trustees, a charitable corporation's board of directors
has more discretion over its charity's mission and assets, except for restricted
gifts, which are held in trust.").
71. See supra Part II.A (discussing the fiduciary duties ordinarily owed by
charitable corporate management and the autonomy ordinarily enjoyed by such
management).
72. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 450 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009); Eason, supra note 45, at 708-11 (noting the
dilemma of this "fuzzy middle ground"); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 cmt. a & reporter's notes 1-6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009) (discussing standards for compliance with restricted-gift terms (quoting
and drawing from Eason, supranote 45, at 705-06, 710-11)); infra notes 78, 81
and accompanying text.
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corporation. Those duties typically underlie managerial decisions
that precede any cy pres action. As a result of this disconnect,
charitable management may be tempted to proceed with similar
disregard for the strict trust-law concepts on which cy pres doctrine
rests.
Management has two general options as to how it proceeds
when confronting this fuzzy middle ground. Viewing deference to
the dead hand as a sliding scale, management's options essentially
lean toward opposite ends of that scale. From management's
perspective, the easier but perhaps less satisfactory choice lies at
the more donor-deferential end. This choice is characterized by
management's
construing
the
donor's
restrictions
very
conservatively in terms of permissible uses of the gifted property
and then staying that narrow course unless and until absolute
impossibility arises. At that point, judicial guidance would be
sought with regard to the proper use of the gifted property. This
option involves a great deal of reverence for the duty of obedience,
coupled with restraint in pursuing the full scope of managerial
discretion potentially available. This option is easier because it
suggests little thought beyond a strict-constructionist view of
restrictive-gift language, resorts to judicial approval at the first sign
of trouble, and raises little risk of having managerial conduct called
into question. It is often less satisfactory to charitable management,
however, for two reasons.
First, as a normative matter, it elevates the donor's unyielding
directive above managerial discretion to pursue an evolving
charitable mission in the most effective and efficient manner
possible as circumstances change over time. While those who favor
a more donor-centric approach might see this as perfectly
acceptable, this reality may actually undermine compliance with
donor intent.74 As new managers take over and memory of the
donor fades, for example, organizational gratitude may yield to
resentment of the inanimate donor restriction, and managerial
75
temptation to disregard the donor's terms may grow.
The second reason that a conservative managerial approach
73. Indeed, the Reporter for the Principles on the Law of Nonprofit
Organizationscomments:

[T]oo great a focus on the dictates of the donor can infringe on the
fiduciaries' ability to govern. The challenge for the law is how to
confine the legal significance of settlor or donor intent to those assets
that explicitly carry limitations, and how to balance the competing
values of benefactor intent and governing-board flexibility in light of
the imperatives of current conditions.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGs. ch. 4 introductory note at 2
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).

74. See supranotes 8, 39 and accompanying text.
75. See Atkinson, supra note 21, at 91 ("As the donor's death recedes into
the past ... later generations of fiduciaries will feel less beholden to the dimly
remembered donor.").
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finds less favor is more directly consequential in nature. That
reason recalls the previously noted malleability of cy pres criteria
and the resulting unpredictability inherent in any judicial resolution
based on that doctrine.7 6 Charitable management often fears the
ultimate destination to which a cy pres course of action may lead.
That destination likely includes a binding judicial pronouncement of
donor intent and a corresponding mandate as to the permissible
uses of the gifted property. Such a pronouncement essentially
forecloses any hope of managerial discretion to find flexibility on
either count going forward. Even worse, the court might discern a
narrow donor intent and then declare that compliance with the
donor's terms (as so construed) has become "impossible,
impracticable, or illegal."
This could potentially remove the
property from charitable management's control entirely." So what
on first glance appears to be the straight and narrow path for
management is in reality a blind curve, and cy pres provides no hint
of whether the promised land or sheer cliff lurks around that corner.
In contrast to this conservative managerial approach, the other
option available to charitable management pays less deference to
the dead hand and forestalls (or ignores) the judicial avenue with
much more vigor. That option entails management implementing
its own more expansive view of the donor's gift restrictions. Perhaps
without expressly stating (or even realizing) that it is doing so,
management would invoke its perceived discretionary latitude to
construe the terms of the gift and the acceptable means by which
those terms might be carried out. 78 This favored interpretation
would, of course, avoid the aspects of the restrictions that would be
problematic were the restrictions more narrowly construed. By so
circumventing the problematic potential of a donor's restrictions,
management will have avoided any need for judicial authorization
for departing from those restrictions and thus will also have avoided

76. See supra notes 35-41, 51 and accompanying text.
77. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 470 cmt. d (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009) (noting how a petition for modification might transform into
a suit for breach of the donor's restriction, "possibly resulting in the transfer of
the trust or gift to another charity subject to the same .. . restriction"); supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 410 reporter's
note 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) ("The governing board will often have to
exercise some level of discretion in implementing donor intent."); id. § 470 cmt.
b ("[I]n carrying out the . . . terms of a gift ... for which it is trustee, the charity

will often have to exercise its judgment .... Courts minimize the risk of
vexatious litigation by refusing to second-guess decisions committed to the
discretion of the ... governing board."); see also id. § 430 cmt. a (noting that a
charity's fiduciaries discharge their duties relating to compliance with donor
gift terms if, among other things, "no facts arise that would cause a reasonable
fiduciary, acting in good faith, to suspect noncompliance"); supra notes 72-73
and accompanying text; infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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the possibility of an unfavorable judicial mandate.79
The availability of this second option suggests that if a
charitable organization finds it difficult (or undesirable) to comply
with a strict (or perhaps more obvious) construction of a donor's
terms and if that organization is reluctant to pursue judicial
modification of those restrictions, then the organization might
simply unilaterally (re)interpret the gift terms or otherwise
disregard them. This is not to suggest that such action would be
proper or in many instances even defensible. But if malfeasance
states the matter too harshly, the opportunities for eviscerating
donor intent somewhere along this managerial path should be
apparent. Ultimately, the unpredictability and potential mandate of
a cy pres action coupled with lax attorney-general enforcement of
compliance with donor terms might easily lead charitable
management in this direction." The lure of this course of action is
79. For an earlier explanation of this interpretive circumvention of the
problematic aspects of donor restrictions, see Eason, supra note 45, at 722-32.
That article discusses the issue in the context of the Robertson v. Princeton
University dispute. Later commentators have also embraced that analysis in
the same context.
See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 18, at 88-92, 106.
Interestingly, Professor Goodwin notes that as a result of the settlement
between the parties, the Robertson gift "is to be subject to the same restriction
as the original grant to the Robertson Foundation, but going forward Princeton
alone will have the discretion and authority to interpret the purpose of the
Robertson Fund and to determine the appropriate means to implement its
purposes." Id. at 96.
80. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 18, at 79 ("No better inducement to
noncompliance could be devised than the law as it currently stands."). Many
commentators regard the formal legal enforcement of nonprofit fiduciary duties
as lax. See, e.g., FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 151 (noting that breachof-duty matters are typically settled quickly with state attorneys general, while
the notoriety arising from reports of such breaches "can be devastating"); id. at
169 ("The duty of care ... is quite low, and .. . liability [is] improbable except in
the most egregious cases. . . ."); id. at 248 (noting that "attorney general

oversight [is] more theoretical than deterrent"); Johnson, supra note 7, at 388
("[Tihis monitoring mechanism has been deficient because of the attorneys
general's lack of interest and funds to monitor and pursue vigorously cases
involving [compliance with donor terms]."). Professor Atkinson indicates that
well-intentioned management may be led in the direction described in the text
by the prospects of lax attorney-general enforcement of the noted fiduciary
duties. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 143-48. This route might also be
accompanied by some negotiation to appease the donor's descendants. See id. at
151-53. The possibility of subsequent judicial ratification of the organization's
departure from the donor's instructions could further underlie the
organization's decision to proceed in this manner. See id. at 143-44. Professor
Atkinson cautions, however, that absent some confidence in the attorney
general's or court's likely view of such action, "the zone of comfort [here] is not
only ill-defined, but also small." Id. at 144. Less-principled organizational
management might ignore all of these perils and simply disregard donor
instructions because management seeks to advance its own alternate agenda
(without regard to any true need for gift modification). See id. at 161-62.
Perhaps even less flatteringly, these fiduciaries might seek to "indulge their
private vanities or inflate their egos" by acting as they see fit, without regard to
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magnified by the imprecise boundaries of managerial prerogative in
this context.
Consider in this regard the most recent ALI
pronouncement on the issue: "It can be difficult .. . to draw the line
between good-faith implementation [of gift terms] (committed to the
charity's discretion) and either breach or . .. the need for the charity
to seek judicial modification (deviation or cy pres).""
C.

Summary
So here we find restricted-gift duties grounded in trust law,
coupled with the trust-law remedial doctrine known as cy pres.
These doctrines clearly revere donor intentions. Ongoing adherence
to such intentions under current doctrine, however, ultimately turns
upon some divination of the nature and scope of a given donor's
subjective desires, with that inquiry often formally undertaken only
very late in the life of a restricted gift. In addition to the speculative
aura that haunts the various facets of cy pres analysis, cy pres
doctrine also does little to guide managerial conduct during the
potentially long-lived managerial stage in the life of a donor's
restricted gift.
Paradoxically, this lack of guidance and the
limitations imposed by others. Id. at 161.
81. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGs. § 450 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009). Prior versions of the Principlesshow the difficulties that the
Reporter faced in articulating the nuances of this issue. In a somewhat
ambiguous early pronouncement, the Reporter concluded that "[a] charity is
considered to comply with a gift restriction if the charity acts in good faith,
reasonably construes the terms of the restriction, adheres to all material
requirements of the restriction, and seeks relief under [cy pres
doctrine] ... when appropriate."
Eason, supra note 45, at 724 (quoting
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 425(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3,

2005)). A later draft limited such broad discretion to implementing (versus
construing) donor intent. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.
§ 420(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007). The most recent draft approves of
action where "the charity reasonably implements all material requirements of
the term, or, when appropriate, seeks judicial instruction.. . or modification."
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
Ambiguities nonetheless remain due to the inherent complexity of the issue and
the difficulty of distinguishing acts of "construction" from those of
"implementation." See, e.g., id. § 450 cmt. a ("The charity generally has
discretion, consistent with fiduciary duties, in deciding when to invoke this
Section [dealing with modification procedures]."); id. § 450 cmt. b ("Some of the
disputes between donors and charities ... could be viewed as cases where the
charity ... might have been wise to get court approval of their desired use of
the ... gift, which approval often would have been granted as a reasonable
construction of the settlor's or donor's intent."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGs. § 240 cmt. b, illus. 4 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007) ("A court
should approve the change even though the restriction is not impossible to
honor, because the board has determined in good faith that the restriction is
administrative rather than the donor's charitable purpose. Applying cy pres
instead of deviation could mean the difference between deferring to a
reasonable determination by the charity fiduciaries and adhering to the wishes
of [the donor] unless it becomes impossible or impracticable (or wasteful) to do
so . . . ."); see also supra note 78.
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malleable employment of donor intent to justify unpredictable cy
pres outcomes can easily lead charitable management down a path
that threatens the very intent cy pres purports to guard.
As an unwelcome complement to these issues, we find a
necessary but uncertain degree of permissible managerial discretion
that further complicates the tasks of donors, charitable
organizations, and courts. To echo the words of another recent
commentator in support of the proposal which follows, what is
needed is
a procedural framework that allows a charity to attenuate the
perpetual force of restrictive language in the face of societal
change. This framework must operate to discipline the charity
in its decision-making processes. Because donor-imposed
restrictions guarantee the diversity of the charitable sector, a
liberty to interpret restrictive language under certain
circumstances should not operate as a license to apply funds
with little or no regard for the donor's charge. 82
Parts III through VII develop precisely such a framework.
III. THE CENTRAL QUESTION, RECONCEIVED
Why do donors impose restrictions on their gifts in lieu of
simply donating that property outright and without restrictions?
For any individual donor and gift, the specific answers may be
varied and perhaps unknowable, and the identity of the inquisitor
and the reason for asking may color the proffered answer. We could,
of course, concede the entire debate to those who advocate for more
emphasis on the most efficient current use of gifted property. We
could similarly disregard donor intent altogether when restrictions
become problematic or perhaps after some stated period of time has
passed since the date of the gift. Indeed, recent treatment of cy pres
doctrine evidences some movement in this direction." But casting
out donor intent altogether oversimplifies and assumes too much in
light of the enduring nature of this dead-hand versus charitableefficiency debate, and particularly in light of the historical relevance
of donor intent when cy pres circumstances rise to the fore."
This Article posits that both charitable-efficiency and donorintent concerns can be better served by a new approach to
evaluating donor intent.
This Part thus presents a unique
conception of how "donor intent" should be understood and utilized
when restricted-gift terms become problematic.
The analysis
proposed here changes the basic dynamic underlying current cy pres
doctrine. This new proposal pursues predictability-or at least a
82. Goodwin, supra note 18, at 81.

83. See supranote 43.
84. Regarding the debate over charitable efficiency, see infra notes 87-88
and accompanying text.
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rational framework for decision making-by supplanting many of
the subjective elements of cy pres analysis and restricted-gift
management with a more broadly conceived view of donor intent.
That view, in turn, suggests a more structured analysis that should
actually serve to guide the actions of charitable management long
before cy pres is otherwise implicated.
Specifically, the phenomenon of restricted giving can be better
understood and dealt with by asking a more generic question before
concerns over a given individual donor or her particular restrictions
obscure other considerations. The question is this: why do some
donors impose restrictions on gifts in lieu of simply donating that
property outright and without restrictions? Four broadly applicable
and categorical motivations are worthy of further analysis: donors
impose restrictions on their gifts in order (1) to support the donor's
belief in worthy charitable objectives and the causes best suited to
accomplishing those objectives; (2) to constrain charitable
management from straying from the donor's own view of what are,
or how to accomplish, those charitable objectives; (3) to freeze in
place the donor's individual notions of appropriate but evolving
public policy; and (4) quite simply, to exercise and enjoy a significant
power that society has chosen to bestow on donors through the law
of charitable gifts. As will be demonstrated, these four categorical
answers illuminate the extent to which, why, and by what means
donor restrictions deserve ongoing respect when circumstances
render strict adherence to those restrictions problematic.
Importantly, this focus on donors' restrictive motivations does
not require some mystical insight into a given donor's mindset or
some presumed ability to discern the subjective intentions of every
donor. In evaluating and categorizing donor motivations, the
broader perspective adopted here instead focuses on the objective
outcomes or consequences that a restriction might force on the
recipient charity (or society in general) and groups those restrictions
accordingly." Any restriction forces or precludes certain actions
with regard to the gifted property and the charity's future conduct in
utilizing that property, and donors know this.
The donor
85. For a recent example of a court casting an individual donor's intentions
in terms of that donor's motivation, see Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum)
v. Fisk University, wherein the court noted:

It is apparent from Alfred Stieglitz's will, the 1948 Petition
Georgia O'Keeffe filed in the surrogate's court, and Ms. O'Keeffe's
letters to [the charitable recipient's president] that followed, that the
charitable intent motivating the gifts of the Stieglitz Collection and
Ms. O'Keeffe's four pieces to the University was to make the
Collection available to the public in Nashville and the South for the
benefit of those who did not have access to comparable collections to
promote the general study of art.
Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-R3CV, 2009 WL 2047376, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2009). See generally
supra note 46 (discussing the Fisk University dispute).
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motivations underlying the imposition of such restrictions, in turn,
can be explained, evaluated, categorized, and dealt with by reference
to the particular constraints imposed.
In light of this more
objectively focused undertaking, consideration of a given donor's
particular restrictions can then be addressed in a more consistent
and predictable manner.
Such evaluation and categorization thus suggests a new
analysis to be employed where gift restrictions are in issue, as
explained in Parts IV through VII. That analysis avoids the
inherent cy pres weakness that results from obsessing over the
idiosyncratic and often unknowable particulars of a given donor's
intentions, yet it still maintains a healthy respect for donors
generally. Equally important, the analysis proposed here provides a
structure and rationale that-in contrast to current doctrineshould positively influence managerial conduct on matters
pertaining to honoring donor intent long before gift restrictions
become problematic. The first step in this analysis requires an
appreciation of donors' charitable motivations, as discussed next.
IV. PROMOTING CHARITABLE OBJECTIVES

As a class, donors impose restrictions on gifts as a means to
promote some particular belief in worthy charitable pursuits. At the
very least, donors hinge their particular beliefs on some chosen
charitable pursuit and reap benefits accordingly.8 6
These
observations support the argument that when gift restrictions
become problematic, attention should focus first and foremost on the
"charitable pursuit" in lieu of the "particular belief" emphasized in
traditional cy pres analysis.87 We should never lose sight of the
overriding reason the gift qualifies as charitable to begin with,
striving first to see the charitable forest notwithstanding the donor's
particular and restrictive trees. In one sense, this simply represents
another endorsement of the rationale underlying the trend to
liberalize cy pres, a trend based on a belief that changing societal
needs should take precedence over the stale dictates of the dead

86. As noted supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text, the ability to impose
restrictions that govern into perpetuity is included among those benefits. See
generally Karen J. Sneddon, Comment, The Sleeper Has Awakened: The Rule
Against Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REV. 189 (2001)
(discussing the Rule Against Accumulations, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and
perpetual trusts).
87. Indeed, this positive understanding is consistent with the trend toward
liberalizing cy pres, which is based on the belief that more emphasis should be
placed on the societal benefit as opposed to dead-hand controls. See supra Part
I.B. This theme appears consistently in commentary on cy pres doctrine,
including the works of Professors Atkinson, Chester, Johnson, and others, as
well as in the commentary to the UTC and Restatement (Third) reform projects.
See sources cited supra notes 4-5, 7-12.
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hand."
On a deeper level, however, donor intent so characterized
suggests an alternative analytical approach that courts and
recipient organizations should follow when dealing with donor
restrictions.
That approach provides a logical and workable
framework for placing charitable concerns on a more balanced
footing with donor gift restrictions, while maintaining due regard for
both. As to balance and workability, recall that two problems
inherent in any current version of cy pres doctrine are the
overwhelming force that subjective donor intent ultimately
commands and the general lack of guidance provided to courts or
charities charged with honoring that intent."
The analysis
presented in this Part, in contrast, provides guidance and rationale
by offering a more objective, structural framework for identifying
those charitable concerns that are central to a donor's gift. The
suggested framework also provides a coherent method for discerning
those aspects of the donor's directives that deserve the greatest
deference when restrictions become problematic.
Note that
although the analysis derives from a categorical understanding of
donor restrictions generally, the suggested approach incorporates a
guided concern for the individual donor.
A.

Identifying Core CharitableConcerns
When difficulties arise with a particular gift restriction, the
analytical focus should never lose sight of the public benefits that
qualified the donor's gift as charitable in the first instance. Under
current doctrine, however, once a charitable purpose is found,
attention shifts dramatically to donor intent.90 The proposal here
recognizes the donor's restrictive nuances, but with an up-front
acknowledgement that those nuances fall first when charitable
purposes are threatened.9' Does this suggest that donor intent
should be treated cavalierly or unapologetically subordinated to
current needs, as charitable-efficiency proponents might assert?9 2
88. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmts. a-b (2003)
(discussing the modern rationale underlying cy pres doctrine and the policy
concern for inefficient use of charitable assets).
89. See supra Part I.B.
90. See supra Part I.A.

91. Cut the diseased trees, in other words, to save the forest. This
argument finds support in the UTC and Restatement (Third) position that a
donor's charitable intent should generally be presumed. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text; supra text following note 48. The statement here, however,
reflects not just a rebuttable presumption, but rather an absolute-that some
charitable purpose exists and should guide cy pres decision making as an

unyielding analytical principle.
92. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
charitable-efficiency argument). As for proponents of that view, see, for
example, Sisson, supra note 27, at 651-52 (arguing for inclusion of
"inexpedience" or "inefficiency" as grounds for invocation of cy pres).
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No. Rather, this approach emphasizes appreciating donor intent as
something inseparably linked to and derived from the requirement
that (by definition) any charitable gift-restricted or not-must in
some way serve a charitable purpose.
In this regard, it is axiomatic that "charity" suggests a benefit to
the public or to some segment thereof that is broad or important
enough that society as a whole can be said to benefit from service to
that class of beneficiaries.9 ' Consistent with this fundamental
premise, identifying the donor's charitable purpose should focus
always on the likely beneficiaries to be served by the donor's
expressed charitable vision.94 The difficulty, of course, lies in
finding some consistent and substantively meaningful way to
approach this task that informs cy pres decision making when
aspects of that donor vision become clouded. Here, a simple analogy
provides both analytical structure and a deeper understanding of
the suggested characterization of donor intent.
Consider the concept of "charity" as resembling a funnel, with
the broadest conceptions of purpose and societal benefit occupying
the mouth of that funnel. The mouth is lined with such notions as
"education," "religion," "health care," "relief of poverty," etc.95 A
donor places her gift into the charitable stream or funnel, and then
through tailored restrictions she can direct her funds further down
the mouth of the funnel to serve an ever-narrowing class of
beneficiaries. 96 The progression from a gift "for education," "to X
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (describing the
parameters of "charitable trust purposes"); id. § 28 cmt. a ("The common
element of charitable purposes is that they are designed to accomplish objects
that are beneficial to the community-i.e., to the public or indefinite members
thereof-without also serving what amount to private trust purposes. . . ."); id.

§ 28 cmts. a(1)-a(2), c, e (providing further explanation of charitable purposes);
supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "charitable").
94. The beneficiary class may be as broad as the public at large, or it may
be some indefinite segment of the public. Even a gift "to promote health care,"
"to prevent cruelty to animals," or "to promote national security" would qualify
as charitable, even though the donor has failed to specify a specific "for whom"
or otherwise name a particular institution or means to pursue the donor's
objective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. 1 (2003) (discussing
broadly worded charitable gifts that are semantically directed toward purposes
generally regarded as charitable but that lack specification of any particular
beneficiary class). Such broad statements, of course, leave much to the
discretion of the charitable recipient, are much less likely to become frustrated,
due to the breadth and generality of wording, and therefore are much less likely
to be subject to cy pres analysis in the first instance. The most likely judicial
involvement would come in naming a charitable recipient when the donor has
otherwise failed to specify one.
95. See supra notes 3, 93 (discussing the general categories that define the
broad boundaries of charity).
96. So long as the charitable flow is not so restricted that it ceases entirely,
the donor's gift will qualify as charitable and thus be accorded all the benefits of
a charitable contribution, including potentially perpetual recognition of the
donor's restrictive mandate. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28
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University," narrowed to "for scholarships," then "for graduate
students," "studying law," and finally "drawn from a pool of minority
candidates" exemplifies both the noted progression and a narrowing
that does not unduly constrain the charitable flow.
The broader insight lies in recognizing that when evaluating
donor restrictions, decision makers should more deliberately
acknowledge the donor's chosen path for her "charity" to follow as it
flows down the ever-narrowing funnel. This acknowledgement
should include an express explanation of the broadly conceived
public benefit that might accrue from the donor's gift, such as the
promotion of education or the relief of poverty. That explanation
should then detail, by reference to the beneficiary class served at
each stage, the winnowing process by which the donor narrowed her
charity via her restrictions.9 7 Proceeding in this manner promotes a
more reasoned articulation of both the donor's charitable vision and
precisely when (and why) the charitable flow becomes cut off by
"impossibility" or some other cy pres circumstance tied specifically
to the donor's restrictions. This process would reveal, for example,
the point at which the donor's restricted gift no longer serves the
identified class, or the point at which the class (or service thereto)
becomes narrowed beyond that required to find benefit to the
greater public good.
Once this point of blockage is reached, the decision maker
should undertake the final step in this structured analysis, which
entails reversing course from the point of charitable frustration and
retracing the decision maker's analytical steps back toward the
identified broader charitable purpose. The decision maker should
follow the already-illuminated donor path back up the nowbroadening funnel until reaching the point at which a viable
charitable class can once again be served. The path to reconciliation
pursues what should be the core of any gift deemed "charitable" by
discarding the donor's blocking restrictions until a charitable
purpose can once again be served. This represents the point, or (to
move away from the funnel analogy) the still-valid charitable
purpose, that the donor's gift should prospectively support. Donor
restrictions that do not impede that charitable purpose or flow
would be preserved; those blocking restrictions that prevent its
accomplishment would fall."
Far from ignoring an individual donor's intentions, the proposed
reporter's notes cmt. a (2003) (explaining that benefits may be provided to a
class too narrow to qualify an otherwise charitable directive as falling within
the legal bounds of charitable purposes).
97. As alluded to supra note 94, the more broadly the donor states her
charitable purpose, the easier this analytical task becomes.
98. In essence, the overriding goal is to gradually liberalize the impact of
the donor's terms until some serviceable charitable class not only can be
discerned but also can be served through the resulting utilization of the donor's
gift.
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analysis actually preserves donor intent in two specific ways. First,
the donor's gift will continue to support the donor's chosen genre of
charitable purposes-recall that an express identification of that
genre (for example, education, religion, etc.) served as the starting
point for the analysis here. Second, those of the donor's restrictions
that do not otherwise prevent service to such purposes will continue
to define the more narrow scope of "charity" for which the donor's
gift may be employed going forward. Thus, a donor gift "to provide
rehabilitative assistance to members of the U.S. National Guard
injured in combat during the Iraq military campaign begun after the
September 11, 2001, attacks" could be modified to provide
rehabilitative assistance to Guard members who receive such
injuries during the related conflicts in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Such modification might be called for, for example, in the fortunate
event that all such survivors of the Iraq conflict were fully
rehabilitated and no more Guard members were (or were to be)
present in Iraq.
Because the proposed analysis appreciates the donor's gift as
fundamentally dedicated to charitable purposes, the traditional cy
pres caveat that a donor may have preferred that her gift fail
becomes moot. Such charitable purposes thus begin the analysis
and remain always visible, relevant, and in some way attainable.9 9
To the extent that the donor sought more through the exercise of
dead-hand control, the donor simply asked for too much. To the
extent that the donor lacked any broader charitable aspirations
beyond the narrowest implementation of her restrictions, the donor
simply gave too little to demand such absolute and perpetual
deference to her now-stale mandates.
Contrast the approach inherent in current cy pres analysis.
Under that approach, after first determining that the gift is in some
way charitable, any view of broader charitable notions falls by the
wayside. Such charitable notions specifically fall prey to a "bottomup" view of the donor's intentions.o Current cy pres analysis, in
other words, quickly discards "charity" in favor of looking up the
funnel from its narrow bottom. This view reveres the donor's
99. And if the donor specified an alternative charitable beneficiary, such
specification simply indicates the donor's preferred path back up the charitable
funnel should a blockage arise. In other words, when the donor's restrictions
become problematic and an alternative charitable beneficiary is named, decision
makers should acknowledge the donor's preferred method to restart the
charitable flow. This assumes, of course, that the named alternative beneficiary
would be capable of carrying out the donor's terms without any modification
whereas the current beneficiary would not. If the donor specified an alternative
taker that is not a charitable organization, this would contradict the notion of
the donor having placed her property into the charitable funnel in the first
instance and would thus be ignored as beyond the bargain pursuant to which
society granted perpetual influence to the donor. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., supranotes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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restrictions as a point of blockage that should only be forced toward
broader charitable notions in compelling circumstances, and then
only if the donor can be said to have favored that outcome. Even
though the donor's gift must serve charitable purposes in order to
enjoy the benefit of perpetual restrictions, the bottom-up view under
current cy pres analysis allows the donor to demarcate a point of
blockage to broader charitable ends, beyond which decision makers
may not look.
B.

A ComparisonofAnalyses and Outcomes

Consider in this regard a more exacting analysis of the example
introduced earlier concerning the 1940 gift to establish and support
a hospital wing for the treatment of tuberculosis patients.' 0 ' Given
that today such patients almost exclusively need only outpatient
treatment, the question becomes whether the gift should be modified
to support the general operations of the hospital, should be modified
to fund a tuberculosis outpatient clinic (either within or independent
of the hospital and community), or should perhaps lapse altogether.
Compare, in particular, the rationales for these outcomes, first
under current cy pres doctrine and then under the analysis proposed
here.
Under current cy pres doctrine, a decision maker could easily
justify any of these outcomes by reasoning backwards from the
desired result.102 If the decision maker prefers keeping the money
within the hospital, for example, she need simply conclude that the
donor possessed an unrebutted "general intent" at least to that
extent, such that leaving the funds in the hands of the hospital
101. See supra text accompanying and following note 52.
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing ends-oriented
manipulation of cy pres analysis).
Courts may also engage in such
manipulation by invoking a trust-modification doctrine known as equitable
deviation when cy pres is otherwise unavailable or might produce a contrary
result. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 375, 380. Professor Johnson
observes that "courts consider the results generated by the application of each
doctrine before determining which doctrine to apply (courts tend to peek at the
outcome before deciding whether to apply cy pres or equitable deviation)." Id. at
380. Debating the merits of the alleged distinction between cy pres and
equitable deviation is beyond the scope of this Article, which in any event
addresses subordinate purposes (typically considered the domain of equitable
deviation) in Part VII. Note, however, that the alleged distinction has been
criticized by multiple commentators as specious and lacking any principled
basis. See, e.g., Eason, supra note 1, at 436-39 & n.263 (discussing the alleged
distinction and related critical commentary). Yet all three recent reform
projects retain the distinction between the doctrines. See UNIF. TRUST CODE
§§ 412-13 (amended 2005); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 66-67 (2003).
The offered policy justification for retaining this "often-blurry distinction" lies in
the relatively less-demanding requirements for invoking equitable deviation to
modify "administrative" donor terms. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT
ORGS. § 460 cmts. a-b & reporter's notes 1-9 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
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comports in some proximate way to the donor's stated intentions. If,
alternatively, the decision maker prefers continued service to
tuberculosis patients, the decision maker need only conclude that
the donor cared more about the tuberculosis patient than she did
about the place of treatment (that is, the hospital). The funds would
then necessarily be applied to supporting an outpatient facility and
not the general operations of the hospital. If the decision maker
instead prefers to have the gift lapse since it cannot be utilized
exactly as specified by the donor, the decision maker can simply
assert that given the specificity of the gift, the donor lacked general
intent or, under liberalized doctrine, that her general intent lay
elsewhere or that the specificity set forth in the donor's terms
rebutted any presumption of general charitable intent. Since each
case is said to be fact-specific, current doctrine allows for any of
these outcomes, with little basis for predicting or refuting any one
result.
Now consider the same scenario under the analysis proposed in
this Article. The donor would in the first instance be regarded as
placing her gift in service to charity, with health care being the
broad conception that demarcates the mouth of the funnel. That
charitable purpose would define the analytical starting point, as the
donor restricts the path of her charitable outpouring by narrowing
the class served through her gift restrictions. Tracing that path
toward the donor's most narrowly described purpose, markers would
appear along the way for persons suffering from disease and then for
those in need of health care in the community expected to be served
by the donor's chosen provider.'0 3 As the donor's narrowing path
reaches the class of persons suffering from tuberculosis within the
donor's chosen community, the funnel analogy fulfills its promise by
identifying both the problem and the solution.
At this point along the donor's path, the charitable blockage
becomes readily apparent. In this example, that blockage lies in the
donor's attempt to confine her charity even more narrowly so as to
encompass only those tuberculosis patients requiring hospital carea class now eviscerated by scientific advances such that service to
this group yields too little public benefit to be deemed "charitable."
Since nonhospitalized tuberculosis patients remain a viable
charitable class notwithstanding modern medical advances, the
solution easily resolves into the outpatient-clinic alternative. The
solution is found by simply turning upward, toward the broad
103. Stated differently, logic dictates that the class of persons suffering from
a specific disease (tuberculosis) and residing within a hospital's community
would constitute a narrower charitable class than would, for example, persons
residing within the community generally, or persons receiving all types of
health care from that hospital, or persons wherever located and suffering from
disease generally. Each of the latter groups would constitute a larger
charitable class than would those residing within that community and suffering
from tuberculosis.
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charitable purpose first identified, and proceeding up again past the
blockage to the point where service to that charitable purpose and a
corresponding charitable class still endure. Since the original path
to narrowing the donor's broader charitable purpose clearly touched
on community, the funds should presumptively be directed to
treatment in the community served by the donor's chosen
institution, and to treatment provided by that institution if possible.
This last observation suggests an aspect of the proposed
analysis that should be expressly stated: the proffered analysis
prefers a donor's chosen charitable class over the institution
originally identified as affiliated with that class. This represents an
improvement over, or is at least justified relative to, existing
doctrine on several fronts. First, "charity" is defined by reference to
the public benefit derived from service to some purpose that
necessarily implicates a charitable class of persons, however broadly
Institutions likewise receive favorable tax and
conceived. 104
as "charities" by virtue of the quantitatively
status
common-law
identifiable classes of persons they
qualitatively
indefinite yet
05
a charitable class by reference to
specifies
a
donor
So when
serve.
tuberculosis patients at
example,
affiliation-for
its institutional
fall when conflict
must
other
or
the
Community Hospital-one
the institution
prefer
to
always
be
would
choice
arises. Another
(and donors, of course, can make such preferences clear in their gift
terms, thus obviating the need for this step in the analysis). But
since the donor in this example specifically chose to constrain the
institution's discretion when it comes to utilizing the donor's gift in
service of the institution's various activities, such an outcome
suggests an unnecessary broadening of donor charitable
*106
inclinations.
Second, the proposed analysis stops far short of
disenfranchising the donor's chosen institution. As suggested above,
in each case a donor's chosen institution would be afforded the first
opportunity to continue serving the donor's chosen and currently
serviceable charitable beneficiaries, as identified under the proposed
analysis.1o' Absent very specific donor instructions favoring some
104. See supranotes 93-94 and accompanying text.
105. "Orphans" or "the aged" or "students," for example-each is a class
broad enough to warrant status as a charitable class but nonetheless narrow
enough to identify with some precision those intended to be served.
106. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 460 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009) (noting that this determination "depends on the intent of the
donor"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003) (discussing modified
charitable purposes involving gifts to institutions).
107. Contrast the result if the institution were to receive primary
consideration. In that case, using the tuberculosis-hospital-patient example, a
preference for the hospital would vest in the hospital's board virtually unlimited
discretion to use the donor's gift as the board saw fit, while leaving tuberculosis
sufferers without a viable treatment alternative. Such an outcome would seem
to contradict the donor's stated inclusion of tuberculosis victims.
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other institution going forward, the hospital in the earlier example
may choose whether to pursue the outpatient-treatment possibility
or whether to allow that opportunity to pass to an organization
better suited to meet that need. In this way, charity (via service to a
publicly beneficial class), charitable efficiency (via the original
institution's choice on whether and how to proceed in serving that
class), and donor intent (via adherence to class identification and
any stated alternative institutions) are all promoted in a meaningful
way. Coupled with the predictability fostered by the structured
analysis presented above, the same can hardly be said of outcomes
under any current version of cy pres doctrine. 0 8
C.

Summary
By reconceptualizing donor intent as necessarily motivated by a
belief in charitable pursuits and then tailored to some particular
donor vision, the proposed analytical framework finds traction.
That analytical model provides a structure for ascertaining those
charitable considerations that are at once both central to the donor's
concern and still relevant in an evolved charitable environment.
This is accomplished through a more objectively reasoned approach
to (1) identifying the broader charitable purposes served by the
donor's vision, (2) tracing the donor's path to her particular
charitable vision via the larger charitable universe and then
narrowing the charitable classes served, (3) articulating when and
why there might be a need to depart from the donor's precise terms
due to problematic narrowing of the "charitable" aspect of the gift,
and (4) ascertaining the modified charitable purpose to be
prospectively served by the donor's gift by retracing the donor's
restrictive path to reach the point at which the charitable "flow"
resumes.
The proffered approach serves both donor intent and broader
societal objectives, with guidance and in ways not captured by either
traditional or more liberalized cy pres doctrine. It does so by
highlighting the ultimate need to ascertain a benefited segment of
the public as falling within the realm of the donor's contemplation,
rather than by emphasizing some need to ascertain the nuanced
particulars of a given donor's subjective intentions as a finite limit
on service to the public good. Not directly addressed above,
however, are the promised analytical benefits of providing guidance
to and affecting charitable management prior to confronting a cy
pres conflict. Those benefits and the analysis that leads in that
direction are discussed in Part V.

108. As noted earlier, current doctrine promotes ad hoc decision making in
such cases, paying lip service to rules of construction when convenient but
otherwise doing little to promote consistency in analysis or predictability in
outcomes. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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V. RESTRAINING MANAGEMENT
The alternative analysis proposed in Part IV retains the
traditional remedial focus of cy pres and serves to provide resolution
where gift terms become problematic. In significant contrast to
current doctrine, however, the analysis as further developed in this
Part places deliberate emphasis on the critical role that
management plays in overseeing the implementation of charitablegift restrictions. ' That managerial role is significant in terms of
both potential duration and responsibility for carrying out the
donor's stated intentions. The analysis below therefore aims to
impose a practical and concrete influence on managerial conduct
toward donor restrictions, an influence that should be felt long
before "impossibility, impracticability, or illegality" appear on the
immediate horizon. This is accomplished in great part by giving
express relevance to such prior conduct when cy pres relief
ultimately becomes an issue. The discussion that follows pursues
this course by giving voice to the logical implications of a second
motivating force behind donor-imposed gift restrictions.
A.

Donor Wariness
The second donor motivation lies in the fact that many donors
simply do not trust charitable management to live up to its promises
over time. This wariness might arise from fear of either managerial
malfeasance or managerial incompetence. The suspicion might also
grow directly from the perpetual nature of the control that the donor
seeks to impose through her restrictions, namely, the simple reality
that over time, compliance with the donor's perpetual restrictions
will fall upon a future management that is unfamiliar with and
unknown to the donor."o In any event, the overriding donor worry
is that charitable management might somehow fail to pursue the
donor's charitable objectives adequately, absent the additional
guidance (or constraints) imposed via the donor's restriction. The
objective consequence of donor restrictions at issue here, then, is the
check that such restrictions provide on management's discretionary
use of gifted property.
To some this might seem obvious-indeed, one of the goals of
this Article is to take the unstated obvious and craft it into an
expressly stated and workable analytical tool.
Despite the
obviousness of this donor concern, however, both the traditionally
donor-centric and the more liberalized cy pres doctrine actually have
little practical effect on managerial decisions regarding adherence to
109. In doing so, the discussion builds on the structured approach
introduced through the funnel analogy in Part IV.A.
110. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (touching on such donor
concerns). For a range of techniques that donors might use to exert control over
a charitable gift, see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGs. § 420
reporter's note 8 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
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donor gift restrictions, at least until such time as the "impossibility,
impracticability, or illegality" triggers are squarely in play."' This
overlooks an ongoing variety of managerial decisions and gift
interpretations that will govern the implementation of the very
donor intent cy pres claims to guard. Given the often lengthy period
of time between receipt of a restricted gift and the emergence of a cy
pres circumstance, a doctrine so conceived seems tremendously
wanting.
A Measure of Skepticism
Ultimately, acknowledging this donor motivation and
managerial role suggests a new analytical tack. Specifically, when a
cy pres circumstance arises, all alleged conflicts between the donor's
design and management's view of achievable (and desirable)
charitable objectives should be viewed first as an assertion of
potentially overreaching managerial prerogative and thus viewed
skeptically. After all, any cy pres challenge (or defensive invocation
of the doctrine) to some extent reflects an implicit attempt by
management to liberalize the donor's stated restrictions to
management's own prospective advantage.112 This in turn supports
a presumption against applying cy pres to reform a gift at
management's request or otherwise allowing cy pres to justify
management's departure from a donor's stated terms.
Presumptions, of course, can be conclusive or rebuttable, and
the suggestion here is for a rebuttable one. The requirements for
rebutting that presumption should be strict but achievable and
should ultimately promote the ideals of both donor intent and
charitable efficiency during the potentially protracted period of
managerial stewardship of the gift. The suggested analysis-and in
particular, the requirements for rebutting the suggested
presumption-should therefore influence managerial conduct
toward these two ideals. In service to this end, management should
be deemed to have rebutted the noted skepticism only upon a
showing of meritorious conduct in administering the gift prior to the
cy pres proceeding at hand. Under the analysis proposed here,
management can overcome this skepticism and prevail in a cy pres
proceeding (or in asserting cy pres as a defense to claims of
mismanagement) by presenting favorable evidence on three specific
issues:

B.

111. Even if a cy pres challenge is brought and reform of the gift terms had,
following such modification the doctrine again falls by the wayside-the
managerial stage in the gift's life cycle once again becoming paramount-until
such time as further judicial redress is sought. This assumes, of course, that
the original cy pres proceeding resolves in some way that does not altogether
remove the donor's gifted property from service to charity-an outcome that
would seem to be contrary to the concept of donor intent developed in Part IV.A.
112. See Atkinson, supra note 9, at 107 ("The benefits of this loosening [of
restrictions] would redound.. . to [charitable fiduciaries'] own organizations.").
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(1) Management must show that it has undertaken pursuit of
modification of the gift's terms in good faith, as evidenced by
management's past compliance with its fiduciary duties in
stewarding both the implicated gift and any other restricted
gifts under management's control.
(2) Management must identify some active conflict between
the donor's restrictions and service to a currently acceptable
charitable purpose and class.
(3) Management must then either relinquish the gift or
demonstrate its ability to honor those of the donor's
restrictions that do not unreasonably conflict with current
charitable circumstances by presenting a reasonable plan for
prospectively serving a currently viable charitable class within
the purview of the donor's broader charitable designs.
As will be seen below, focusing on these three issues
incorporates current charitable concerns, managerial prerogative,
and donor intent into cy pres outcomes while fostering managerial
compliance with donor intent long before a cy pres circumstance
arises. The first issue warrants the most explanation here. The
other two elements build on and complement the analysis suggested
in Part IV. Taken together, the analytical approach revealed after
consideration of the factors below provides a predictable and quite
workable model for addressing the various concerns that inevitably
arise when donors impose restrictions on their gifts to charity.
C.

Good Faithand Stewardship
Managerial efforts to escape the strictures of a gift restriction,
or management's defense against a charge that it has improperly
deviated from such a restriction, will always be tainted by some
element of managerial self-interest. After all, what management
prefers restricted gifts over contributions to an organization's
general fund?
So with regard to the presumption that
management's position should be viewed as an assertion of
potentially overreaching managerial prerogative, good faith as
employed here states an ideal in counterpoint to that skepticism.
The more specific and objective thrust of the analysis lies in an
examination of managerial conduct over the life of the gift up to the
time when modification is sought. The incorporation of managerial
conduct in arriving at a managerially favored cy pres outcome
provides an incentive for attentiveness to the gift's terms at all
times before the gift becomes problematic.
Ultimately, if
management has been a good steward of the gift and attempted to
honor the donor's express terms in accordance with management's
recognized fiduciary duties, the consequences for management are
positive.
The analytical pendulum moves one step closer to
rebutting the presumption of skepticism and thus one step closer to
authorizing management's preferred modification of the donor's gift
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terms.
What types of evidence would management present in this
regard? Consistent with sound ethical practices governing gift
solicitations, management should begin by showing that the
recipient organization was fully capable of complying with the
donor's gift terms at the time the organization accepted the gift.On the question of adherence to its duty of care, management could
show that procedures were in place at all times to monitor and
ensure compliance with the terms of the restricted gift." 4 General
notions of good faith play a role here, as management would
strengthen its case by demonstrating that such procedures were in
place for the recipient organization's entire basket of restricted gifts.
Stated negatively, were a lack of internal controls to result in the
misuse of restricted-gift funds, the organization's management
might fairly be regarded as having failed to meet its duty of care by
virtue of its insufficient procedures and lack of attention to this
concern. 115
Similarly, were an organization to accept property limited to
uses tangential to its mission or terminally difficult or costly to
maintain, this would implicate a breach of the managerial duty of
loyalty.116
The same conclusion might also follow were the
organization to accept property burdened with terms that permit the
donor's continued use or exploitation of the property in some
113. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

For gifts that prove

problematic from the outset, management would hope to show that the donor
crafted her restrictions independently or otherwise in disregard of the
organization's input. This would be the case, for example, when a donor devises
property to a university under her will and, unbeknownst to the university,
directs that her funds be used for the education of white students only. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 cmts. a, b(3) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2009).
114. See the recommended procedures for monitoring compliance with donor
gift terms set forth in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430
reporter's note 16 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). The Reporter of the Principles
opines:
The charity's fiduciaries generally discharge their duties with
respect to gifts . .. if the charity board ensures that the charity adopts
reasonable procedures to monitor and verify compliance on a regular
basis; the charity retains for a reasonable length of time sufficient
records to document compliance; and no facts arise that would cause a
reasonable fiduciary, acting in good faith, to suspect noncompliance.
Id. § 430 cmt. a; see also id. § 430 cmt. b(1) ("Needless to say, a charity with
more complete records will find it easier to defend a charge that it breached a
trust, condition, or restriction, but the absence of records does not of itself
constitute a breach."). See generally supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text
(explaining the duty of care).
115. In that case, the remaining evidentiary hurdles to be overcome in
rebutting the presumption under this managerially skeptical component of cy
pres analysis would be heightened.
116. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (explaining the duty of
loyalty).
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manner that subordinates the organization's interests. The duty of
loyalty would be breached in either case because such actions
disserve the faithful pursuit of the organization's charitable
mission." 7
Management could avoid such outcomes by
implementing proper conflict-of-interest policies, gift-acceptance
policies, periodic reviews considering the matching of donor
restrictions with stated (and current) organizational goals, and
similar governance reviews and controls. The analysis suggested
here thus promotes consideration of concerns relevant to advocates
of charitable efficiency as well as those advocating for a more
mission-oriented duty of managerial obedience or fidelity in
adhering to donor-imposed restrictions. 118
Perhaps more significantly for donors, management would have
to demonstrate compliance with its duty of obedience over the life of
the donor's gift."' This should entail not only compliance with
policies and procedures like those suggested above in connection
with the duties of care and loyalty, but also some evidence that
management's interpretation and implementation of the gift terms
have been both reasonable and consistent.120 The proposed analysis
brings this important aspect of managerial conduct directly into the
gift-modification analysis by making such conduct relevant to
rebutting the presumed skepticism. In direct contrast to the current
incentive toward managerial sleight of hand fostered under cy pres
doctrine, the analysis here ensures that management will benefit
from adhering to the straight-and-narrow "high road" when actively
managing donor restrictions.121 This is because, under the proposed
analysis, the common-sense plausibility of management's treatment
of donor terms will affect judicial skepticism (or the lack thereof)
when modification of those terms is at issue.
Reference
to the
"reasonableness"
of management's
interpretation and implementation of donor terms may inject some
level of variability back into the analysis. That standard, however,
is both familiar and more objective in general application than is
current doctrine's claim to probe the absolutes of an individual
donor's subjective intent.122 Reasonableness in this regard would
117. The likelihood of such a breach would be heightened if the donor also
held a fiduciary management position that allowed her to influence the
organization's acceptance of the gift terms.
118. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing obedience and
fidelity); supra notes 87-88, 92 and accompanying text (discussing charitable
efficiency).
119. See generally supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (explaining the
duty of obedience).
120. With regard to "reasonableness," see infra note 122 and accompanying
text.
121. See supra notes 11, 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing the
managerial "high road" and "low road"-to use Professor Atkinson's languageto addressing problematic donor gift restrictions).
122. With regard to "reasonableness" and similar standards implicated in
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consider both the donor's intentions as expressly articulated in her
gift terms and an analytical appreciation of those restrictions in
light of the four donor motivations explained in this Article.'
Ultimately, the reasonableness criterion suggests some deference to
an organization whose management has otherwise acted in
accordance with its fiduciary duties concerning the gift. This would
be particularly so in cases where the donor's literal expression of her
intent lacks the clarity that might otherwise foreclose any need for
interpretation in the first instance.
this restricted-gift/cy pres context, see, for example, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 430 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (noting that
charitable fiduciaries meet their obligations with respect to restricted gifts if,
among other things, "no facts arise that would cause a reasonable fiduciary,
acting in good faith, to suspect noncompliance"); id. § 450 cmt. b ("Some of the
disputes between donors and charities. . . could be viewed as cases where the
charity ... might have been wise to get court approval of their desired use of
the ... gift, which approval often would have been granted as a reasonable
construction of the settlor's or donor's intent."). See also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw
OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 240 cmt. b, illus. 4 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007)
("Applying cy pres instead of [equitable] deviation could mean the difference
between deferring to a reasonable determination by the charity fiduciaries and
adhering to the wishes of [the donor] unless it becomes impossible or
impracticable (or wasteful) to do so . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67
cmt. d (2003) ("[T]he substitute.. . purpose need not be the nearestpossible but
one reasonably similar ... to the settlor's designated purpose. . . ."); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, at 556 (5th ed. 1998) (concluding
that a "rational donor . .. may ... be presumed to accept implicitly a rule
permitting modification of the terms of [his gift] in the event that an unforeseen
change frustrates his original intention"); Atkinson, supra note 9, at 126 ("[IIt
seems that the balance to be struck [when courts consider whether to release
donor restrictions on private trusts] is not the one that a reasonable person
would strike, having weighed the benefits of change ... against the cost of the
change in terms of frustrating the settlor's material purpose . . ..

balance seems to be that which the settlor would have struck..

.

Rather, the

. Here again,

the test is thus subjective, rather than objective . ..."); infra notes 126, 133 and

accompanying text.
123. Those four motivations are set forth together in Part III and explained
in detail in Parts IV-VII.
124. This approach addresses one problem likely inherent in any attempt to
address donor gift restrictions that have in some way become frustrated.
Consider the National Guard example set forth supra text following note 98.
That example contemplated a donor gift "to provide rehabilitative assistance to
members of the U.S. National Guard injured in combat during the Iraq military
campaign begun after the September 11, 2001, attacks." If at some time in the
future there are no National Guard troops recovering from injuries suffered in
Iraq (or any related campaign in Pakistan or Afganistan, as contemplated in
the original example), some choice must be made between future service to
injured troops regardless of military-branch affiliation, service to National
Guard troops injured in service beyond the Iraq conflict and related conflicts, or
some other purpose. The donor has referenced both injured military personnel
as well as National Guard members injured in a particular military campaignand someone must decide which takes precedence now that the donor's original
expression and more logical extensions thereof have been exhausted. The
proposed analysis places that matter, in the first instance, in the hands of
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D.

Conflict Between Restrictionsand Service to Charity
In order to rebut the presumption against liberalizing a donor's
gift restrictions, management should also be required to identify
some active conflict between the donor's restrictions and current
charitable circumstances. Management must be able to explain that
conflict in some manner that goes beyond the bare argument that
(in management's opinion) the donor's property could be put to
better use. Management's task here essentially draws on the
structured analytical framework presented through the funnel
analogy in Part IV. The addition here lies in the idea that
management should be given the first opportunity to frame this
analysis as part of its burden of rebutting the presumption of
skepticism toward management.
Management would accomplish this task by first identifying the
broad purpose underlying the characterization of the donor's gift as
charitable. Management would then trace the donor's restrictive
narrowing of the charitable class served and identify that point of
blockage where the donor's restrictions now unacceptably restrain
service to a currently accepted charitable purpose and class.
Granting management the first opportunity to frame this analysis
should prove significant so long as management is otherwise
successful in rebutting the presumption of skepticism. 125 The ability
to frame the analysis would allow management to define the point of
conflict and to suggest management's favored resolution. So long as
management's proposed analytical structure logically identifies a
real problem with the donor's restrictions and identifies a currently
serviceable
charitable
class with
reasoned
explanation,
management's ideas should prevail.126
Indeed, the analytical
approach outlined in this Article prefers deference to management's
perspective on the cy pres circumstance, provided that management
establishes the merits of such deference by successfully rebutting
the presumption against it.
This approach gives management an incentive to proceed in
good faith and to be reasonable in its offer. The presumptionrebutting
posture
of management's
arguments
requires
charitable management. Because the donor chose to limit her gift to National
Guard members although members of other branches of the military might
have been similarly injured and helped, the construction benefiting National
Guard members seems more appropriate.
That would, however, be
management's argument to make and then defend, not only by reference to
various objective factors (like whether the donor made the gift to a National
Guard organization or an organization assisting all soldiers), but also by
reference to management's prior conduct in stewarding the gift-a relevant
factor affecting judicial skepticism of management's view of the matter.
125. This prerogative should also help mitigate the class-over-institution
preference discussed supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
126. See infra note 133 (discussing "the 'reasonableness' of a plan to serve
charitable purposes going forward").
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management to convince the decision maker to abandon her
skepticism.
Poorly reasoned or self-serving explanations for
abandoning donor restrictions would only harm management's case.
Further inspiring management toward good sense and reason is the
fact that management is in essence selling a basket of goods in this
rebuttal process.12 That basket of goods-which must be accepted
for management's desired gift modification to receive judicial
approval-includes the prudence of management's past conduct, the
reality of a current conflict, and the feasibility of management's
suggested resolution, which is discussed next.
E.

Prospective Service to a Currently Viable CharitableClass
The final step in rebutting the presumption against liberalizing
a donor's gift restrictions remains true to a recurrent theme. That
theme emphasizes identifying and serving the charitable purpose
and class preferred by the donor but still falling within currently
accepted boundaries of "charity."128
In view of these goals,
management must next demonstrate its ability to serve the
charitable class so identified.129 Management can meet this burden
by presenting a reasonable plan for prospectively utilizing the
donor's gift in service to that class.' 30 Consistent with the analysis
thus far presented, that plan must honor those aspects of the donor's
expressed intentions that remain viable in light of current
charitable circumstances. 131
From a judicial perspective, requiring that management's
proposed plan be "reasonable" allows limited judicial leeway to
127. Cf Atkinson, supra note 9, at 107 ("[S]uits that seek, not the relaxing of
particular restrictions, but general removal or relaxation of dead hand
control ... may incur the risk of overreaching. Seeking the whole loaf... in
other words, may diminish [the] charity's chance of getting a half-loaf . . .
128. See supra Part IV.A.
129. Again, the charitable class may center on a charitable purpose intended
to benefit the relevant community or the public at large. See supra notes 93-94
and accompanying text.
130. See generally supra notes 122-24, 126 and accompanying text
(discussing the "reasonableness" standard as applied to management's past
actions and proposed plan).
131. With regard to honoring those aspects of the donor's expressed
intentions that remain viable, see supra text accompanying note 98. If
retaining the gift proves inconsistent with organizational goals in light of
changed circumstances and the evolved charitable class to be served,
management has the option of relinquishing the gift to another organization
better suited to such service, as explained supra text accompanying notes 10708. If the donor has specified an alternative charitable organization, that
organization would then be preferred, but it should be subject to the same
requirement of submitting a reasonable plan. Absent a named alternative
charitable beneficiary and assuming that the analysis resulting in identification
of a currently serviceable charitable class was diligently and intelligently
pursued, finding a replacement charitable organization should be a simple
matter of procedure, given the prize of future possession of the donor's gift.
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reject clearly outmoded charitable plans that serve only to preserve
a donor's gift in a given organization's hands-like continuing to
treat tuberculosis patients in-hospital for no better reason than to
allow the hospital to retain the gift. Inclusion of a reasonableness
standard would also allow courts to reject self-serving plans that
seek to broaden managerial discretion beyond service to a charitable
class identified pursuant to the structured analysis explained in
Part IV. 132
Precedent exists, moreover, for invoking such a
reasonableness standard in the context of evaluating whether a
given path adequately serves identified charitable objectives.13
Ultimately, if there is any merit to a reasonableness criterion in any
area of law, then whether the parameters of a managementproposed plan "reasonably" serve the identified charitable class, in
light of current circumstances, should be determinable with some
positive degree of consistency in rationale.
F.

Summary
Taken together, the requirements of managerial adherence to
fiduciary duties, a management-presented plan for employing a
donor's modified gift in service to an identified charitable class, and
the ability of management to frame the analysis provide benefits not
present under current cy pres doctrine. Charitable management, for
example, has less incentive to surreptitiously circumvent the donor's
stated intentions without judicial authorization.'3 The incentives
here, in fact, push strongly toward above-board, prudent conduct in
stewarding donor gifts in light of the presumptions that must be
rebutted if management's views are to be respected. Moreover, the
more management's plan honors those other aspects of the donor's
expressed intentions that remain viable in light of current
charitable circumstances and the identified class, the more
132. To the extent management would ignore donor restrictions simply
because they are inconvenient or clearly suggest forfeiture of the gift, the
analysis here can only expose such motives if challenged--otherwise, a
monitoring and penalty regime going beyond either current doctrine or this
proposal would be required.
133. Regarding the "reasonableness" of a plan to serve charitable purposes
going forward, see, for example, the articulation of the "impracticable" standard
found in current cy pres doctrine. The Restatement (Third)'s comments explain
that "[tihe doctrine of cy pres may .. . be applied, even though it is possible to
carry out the particular purpose of the [donor], if to do so would not accomplish
the [donor's] charitable objective, or would not do so in a reasonable way."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. c (2003). For an argument that

"impracticability" as so articulated is too little employed in current cy pres
analysis in favor of absolute impossibility, see supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text. See also supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the utilization of "reasonableness" in restricted-gift analysis).
134. See supra Part II.B (explaining the current managerial incentive to
expansively interpret the terms of a donor's gift when a strict interpretation
would hinder a desired course of action).
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management's plan will garner respect from the decision maker.
Appreciating those "other" aspects of a donor's stated restrictions,
however, requires consideration of two final donor motivations for
imposing restrictions on charitable gifts, which will be explained in
Parts VI and VII.
VI. (APOLITICAL) CONSERVATISM: FREEZING PUBLIC POLICY

Race, gender, and similar limitations that sometimes
accompany a charitable gift exemplify a third motivation underlying
donor-imposed restrictions.
For an individual donor, such
restrictions may derive from subjective reasons either benign or
invidious. These types of restrictions, however, have an objective
consequence that lends itself to categorization consistent with the
framework proposed here. Donors impose these types of charitablegift restrictions in order to freeze in time the donors' own views of
appropriate public policy. Restrictions so motivated tend to prevent
the recipient charity from employing the gifted assets in a manner
that conforms to evolving notions of acceptable service to the public
good. As discussed below, such restrictions deserve little respect
when they come to present conflicts with current, fundamental
public-policy objectives.
A Senator'sRacial Viewpoint
U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon's bequest to the City of Macon,
Georgia, provides a classic example of a restriction fitting this
observation. 36 Senator Bacon devised land to the City

A.

to be used as "a park and pleasure ground" for white people
only, the Senator stating in the will that while he had only the
kindest feeling for the Negroes he was of the opinion that "in
their social relations the two races (white and negro) should be
forever separate." 37
Senator Bacon could not have more clearly demonstrated an
135. For a discussion of racial restrictions in the context of charitable gifts,
see FISHMAN & ScHwARZ, supra note 13, at 107. Regarding racial restrictions
and the meaning of "charitable" for purposes of tax exemption and taxdeductible contributions to charity, see Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983), and David A. Brennen, The Power of The Treasury:Racial
Discrimination,Public Policy, and "Charity"in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C.

DAvIS L. REV. 389 (2000).
136. "The City" is utilized in this discussion for simplicity. Senator Bacon
actually devised the land to the Mayor and City Council, and the park was
placed under the control of a Board of Managers. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 297 (1966). For a detailed explanation of the Macon park case, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 reporter's notes cmt. f (2003).
137. Evans, 382 U.S. at 297. The Senator's exact words were that the park
was to benefit the "white women, white girls, white boys and white children of
the City of Macon." Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1968).
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individualized conception of appropriate public policy. With his
restriction, he sought to ensure that his view on the matter ruled in
perpetuity. Senator Bacon has company among donors in this
regard, and such discriminatory gift restrictions have prompted
much litigation during and since the 1960s. 138 Clearly, a charity
today would find it difficult (either legally, morally, or practically) to
abide by such a restriction, thus implicating cy pres analysis by
satisfying one of the threshold doctrinal triggers.'39
Both
traditionally and in some jurisdictions today, however, if a charity
were to seek judicial permission to deviate from the restriction
pursuant to cy pres doctrine, the charity could face the disconcerting
prospect of having the gifted assets removed from its control
entirely. 140
Perhaps in light of this, the City of Macon chose what to many
would seem a logical course of action in its attempts to manage
Senator Bacon's restricted gift. Recognizing a clearly evolving
public policy on matters of racial discrimination, the City
maintained Senator Bacon's park but gradually gave less and less
deference to his racial limitation.141 Senator Bacon's heirs stepped
forward to challenge this departure from donor intent.
In
addressing the prospect of removing the racial limitation via
application of cy pres doctrine, the Georgia Supreme Court,
affirming the trial court's decision, found that the limitation
expressed an essential element of the Senator's intentions.142 The
Senator therefore lacked general charitable intent, and the court
indicated that he would not have wanted the park to continue
absent the racial restriction. 143 As a result, the gift failed and the
138. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 742-43
(7th ed. 2005) (discussing discriminatory trusts and cy pres).
139. Adherence to such a restriction would likely be impossible or illegal.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28 cmt. f., 67 reporter's notes cmts. b-c
(2003).
140. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining the potential
negative ramifications of pursuing cy pres relief).
141. See Evans, 382 U.S. at 297. Consider the City's disincentive for
bringing the matter to court immediately upon concluding that changing
notions of the acceptability of racial discrimination precluded implementing the
restrictive gift terms. By progressively ignoring the donor's restriction but not
going to court, the City may have been strategically delaying the ultimate cy
pres confrontation until changing racial attitudes were more generally
ingrained and thus more likely to lead to a favorable judicial outcome. See infra
Part VI.B. Even though this strategy (if it can in fact actually be ascribed to the
City) did not succeed, from one perspective nothing was lost-the City's
management approach at worst extended the time during which the property
was dedicated to public purposes by delaying the ultimate negative consequence
(forfeiture), which, from a strategic viewpoint, would likely have been the
outcome in any event.
142. See Evans, 165 S.E.2d at 163-64.
143. See id.; see also Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 443 (1970) ("The Georgia
courts concluded, in effect, that Senator Bacon would have rather had the whole
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land reverted to Senator Bacon's heirs.'"
B.

A More ConsequentialAnalysis
In Senator Bacon's case, the gift failed because of changing
attitudes about segregation and an inflexible individual-donorintent-guided approach to cy pres and the discriminatory gift
provision. A 2002 Maryland case, conversely, reflects a more
consequential and policy-oriented analysis. That analysis underlies
the view posited in this Part and should govern when a donor
attempts to force ongoing adherence to a static snapshot of
acceptable public policy.145
In the Maryland case, a medical rehabilitation center faced the
same risk as the City of Macon because of a gift restriction for
"white patients" only.146 Interestingly, the donor in this case
included a nonrestricted gift over to an alternative charitable
beneficiary in the event the original racially restricted gift failed.147
A gift over upon failure of the donor's terms is typically viewed as
strong (direct or rebuttal) evidence that a donor had "specific intent"

trust fail than have [the park] integrated.").
144. Evans, 165 S.E.2d at 163-64, 166. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
result against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Evans, 396 U.S. at 437.
Note that departure from the donor's terms coupled with the resulting cy pres
judicial analysis resulted in removal of the property from charitable uses, which
is often the outcome where specific intent is found and the donor has not named
an alternative beneficiary that is charitable. Donor intent and cy pres
sometimes combine, in other words, to defeat the charitable nature of a gift
entirely. In such a case, whether occurring months or years after the date of
the gift, society does not rescind the benefits of tax deduction, prestige, etc.,
bestowed on charitable donees.
145. Instances of discriminatory restrictions remain an important issue even
today. In some cases, such as the Maryland case discussed next, the racial
restrictions were imposed during the 1960s but remained dormant until an
intervening life estate expired decades later. See, e.g., Home for Incurables of
Balt. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 748-49 (Md. 2002).
More recently, issues have arisen in matters of gender and other
discrimination, as well as in cases involving discriminatory scholarships. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 reporter's notes cmt. f (2003) ("[Tlhe
case law is unsettled on the validity of gender-specific scholarship restrictions
in charitable trusts."); id. § 67 reporter's notes cmt. c ("Also increasingly
common and important are validity and cy pres issues concerning trust
restrictions based on religion, gender, and ethnicity .. . as illustrated by
numerous recent media reports."); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 138, at 743
(discussing racially discriminatory scholarships administered by public
institutions).
146. See Home for Incurables, 797 A.2d at 747-50.
147. See id. at 748, 750. Because the racial limitation was expressed so as to
apply only to the original named beneficiary and not to the alternative
charitable beneficiary, the alternative beneficiary could have received the gift
and complied with all the donor's applicable restrictions (which, as to the
alternative beneficiary, did not include any racial limitation) without any
modification of the donor's terms.
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under the rubric of cy pres analysis.lu
By naming a second
charitable entity as the alternative beneficiary, the donor laid a
clear path for a court to find a failed restriction, specific donor
intent, and forfeiture by the original beneficiary-all without the
detriment of removing the property from the charitable stream, by
virtue of the default taker's charitable status.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, recognized that
giving any effect whatsoever to the donor's racial restriction would
affirm the donor's racial mandate in direct contravention of
contemporary public policy.' 49 The court thus struck the racial
restriction in its entirety through application of cy pres. 50 This
negated the forfeiture provision, which in turn allowed the original
beneficiary to retain the gifted funds and to use them in complete
disregard of the racial component of the donor's restriction. In so
concluding, the court rejected the alternative beneficiary's
individual-donor "freedom of testation" argument' 5 ' in favor of
upholding the public's evolved view of matters pertaining to race. 15 2
In both of the foregoing cases, the objective consequence of
adhering to the donors' restrictions would have been forced
disregard of broader societal notions of appropriate public policy or,
alternatively, forfeiture of the gifted property by a charitable
organization that could not so comply. Public policy evolves and
should be judged by the standards of the time at which a party's
words or actions come into conflict with that policy. '1 This holds
true regardless of any donor's subjective intentions or views and
regardless of any donor's attempt to sanction those who would honor
societal standards pertaining to the greater public good. When
conflict arises in this context, it is the individual actor and not
societal norms that must yield. Nevertheless, advancing notions of
public policy often preclude compliance with a restriction, and
conservative application of cy pres doctrine still permits donor
That
intent to disenfranchise a charitable beneficiary.
148. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003) ("Effect
will also be given to [donor] terms ... providing that [upon failure of the
original gift] the charitable trust is to terminate and that the property . .. is to
pass pursuant to a noncharitable disposition. . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRuSTS § 399 cmt. c (1959) ("If. . . the terms of the trust [provide] that if the
purpose should fail the trust should terminate, the property will not be applied
cy pres ... since the terms of the trust negative the existence of a general
charitable intention [and any gift over will be given effect].").
149. See Home for Incurables, 797 A.2d at 756.
150. Id. ("The illegal racially discriminatory condition in [the] will violates
Maryland public policy .... Consequently, the provisions of the will should be
administered as if the word 'white' was not contained in the bequest. . . .").
151. See id. at 750, 754. With regard to freedom of testation and dead-hand
control, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 138, at 1-30.
152. See Home for Incurables, 797 A.2d at 756.
153. See, e.g., id. ("Today ... there are few if any public policies stronger
than the policy against discrimination based on race.. . .").
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disenfranchisement occurs simply because society's notions of right
and wrong have progressed beyond an individual donor's static and
often aged comfort level. Donor intent should not be accorded such
preeminence.
C.

Normative Conclusions
Three normative conclusions flow from these observations.
First, donor efforts to freeze the evolution of public policy lack any
inherent merit, at least apart from some ideological reverence for
such intent simply because the property at one time belonged to the
donor. It defies logic to assert that positive benefits accrue from
donor mandates that force adherence to widely rejected notions of
public policy. It is one thing to tout the merits of pluralism as
fostered by innovation and nonmajoritarian inclinations in the
charitable sector.'5 1 It is quite another to suggest that societal
notions of fundamental public policies should be subordinate to
contrary individual-donor demands."5
Second, the rationale reflected in the Maryland court's decision
is consistent with the more categorical and consequential approach
suggested in this Article for addressing problematic donor
restrictions. In the context of current cy pres doctrine, however,
there is reason to doubt the influence that the Maryland decision
will exert in cy pres circumstances not involving racial
discrimination."
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether that
court's view will inspire any more coherent application of cy pres so
that predictability and consistency might be found across other
issues and jurisdictions.
The final conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing
observations ties these thoughts together in terms of practical
outcomes and the analysis proposed in this Article.
Donor
restrictions that have the objective consequence of stifling charitable
conformity to evolved notions of public policy, either via affirmative
directive or negative sanction for noncompliance, reflect a category
of donor motives that should be disregarded whenever public policy
precludes further compliance with such restrictions. Courts can
easily discern and classify such restrictions by looking to the
objective consequences attendant adherence to or noncompliance
with these restrictions. 7 Even though the gift may have been quite
154. For a discussion of pluralism in the specific context of donor-restricted
gifts, see, for example, Goodwin, supra note 18, at 117-18, 122. For a more
general discussion of rationales for the nonprofit sector, in which pluralism is
proposed as a key rationale, see FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 13, at 43-60.
155. Consider the discussion of public policy versus dead-hand control set
forth in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003).
156. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 18, at 101 (discussing the limited
invocation of the "illegality" criterion outside the context of gift provisions that
discriminate on the basis of "race, gender, [or] sometimes religion").
157. See, e.g., supratext accompanying notes 149-50.
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acceptable when made, the court need only ask whether the
restriction now commands a violation of contemporary public-policy
standards. If so, the donor's subjective intentions or desires on this
point do not merit further inquiry or respect.
Such an approach might evoke an argument that charitable
giving would be chilled by disregarding such donor directives.158 The
better view, however, holds that the only thing discouraged would be
the unwarranted donor belief that through onerous and often
offensive restrictions, societal progress can be bent to the donor's
will. Expressly disabusing donors of such notions simply articulates
a more balanced donor-charity bargain. That bargain leaves ample
room for other donor directives that contribute positively to a
diverse and pluralistic charitable environment.
VII. A POWER GRANTED-A POWER EXERCISED
The fourth and final categorical motivation underlying donorimposed restrictions is a catchall category that includes those
restrictions without an objective consequence that has been
classified previously. The motivation is quite straightforward:
donors impose restrictions because the law sanctions and enforces
that exercise of power. This Part concerns the proper scope of the
donor's power where the restriction does not fall under any of the
donor motivations yet described.
Donor restrictions that fall into this category include, for
example, a requirement that the donor's name be displayed
prominently on a particular facility, that some charitable activity be
carried out only on a particular piece of property, or that some ritual
or aesthetic fancy be adhered to.' 9 Restrictions that support the
preservation of some standard, belief, or style but that do not
implicate any significant public-policy or inherently charitable
158. For examples of responses to this "chilling" argument, see Atkinson,
supra note 21, at 86 (discussing and refuting consequentialist arguments often
presented in support of dead-hand control); Johnson, supra note 7, at 357
("Instead of chilling the creation of charitable trusts, the expansive use of cy
pres can result in the increased creation of charitable trusts once [donors]
realize that the . . . assets will be put to optimal use to benefit society beyond

the period that the [donor] can foresee, consistent with the [donor's] intent.");
Sisson, supra note 27, at 650 ("The suggestion that a less slavish adherence to
the terms of charitable trusts would discourage their creation is untested,
although . . . historical evidence actually indicates otherwise."). Professor Scott
cites the English experience that limitations on donor control had no chilling
effect on donor contributions whatsoever. ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 23,
§ 399.4; see also Sisson, supra note 27, at 650 (discussing this aspect of
Professor Scott's observations).
159. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. e (2003)
(concerning mixed-purpose trusts); id. § 28 cmt. I (regarding the definition of
"charitable" purposes); Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified

Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33 (1999) (exploring the legal consequences
attendant various types of donor purposes).
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concerns would also fit this category.160
The argument here,
however, in no way endorses the casual disregard of restrictions
falling within the category.
Rather, the argument is one of
prioritization.
A.

Adaptive Prioritization
Restrictions falling into this category deserve respect when cy
pres analysis is implicated. That respect, however, should neither
consume nor dictate the analysis. Donor restrictions that fall into
this final category of motivation should be adhered to and
accommodated, but the decision maker should have the flexibility to
adapt restrictive details that might otherwise thwart the pursuit of
overriding charitable objectives.
A naming restriction that purports to memorialize a donor
indefinitely, for example, should be honored, but not to the extent of
dictating charitable outcomes. Such a restriction finds traction in
the donor-charity bargain because the law authorizes such
concessions as a quid pro quo for the charitable gift. Absent any
legal compulsion, such outcomes might still pertain, although at the
charity's discretion and by virtue of public-relations concerns or a
sense of moral obligation. 161
In other words, the existence of such gift restrictions as cy pres
instigatingand determinative is ultimately attributable to the legal
force accorded such restrictions. The idea that the law must grant
such extensive concessions to the restrictions at issue here, however,
is neither self-evident nor even clearly defensible. 162 Assertions that
"it was the donor's property and the donor should therefore be
allowed to give it away subject to whatever limitations the donor
desired" simply present a value judgment that can never be shown
more true than false. Such arguments, moreover, suggest that a
charitable donor is effectively entitled to purchase from the public a
160. This is not to suggest that gifts directed at, for example, the
preservation of some historical attribute of an art or other cultural or
architectural trend would not have charitable significance in its own right,
worthy of prominent consideration under the analysis posited in Part IV.A.
161. Should problems later arise, the charity would have little difficulty
altering the specific implementation of this obligation. One commentator has
even suggested that the constraints of moral obligation and potentially negative
publicity provide adequate safeguards to donor intent in this regard. See
Atkinson, supra note 4, at 1124-30; see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGS. ch. 4 introductory note at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009)
("[Ciharities have reasons beyond their legal obligations to honor donors'
wishes."). See generally Atkinson, supra note 9 (updating his ideas on cy pres
reform over a decade after the publication of Atkinson, supra note 4).
162. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 21, at 85-86 (discussing and refuting
arguments often presented in support of dead-hand control); see also supra note
158 and accompanying text (regarding the lack of support for the argument that
charitable giving would be "chilled" absent extensive concessions to donor
control).
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perpetual right to define and control the public good. Unless
accepted wholesale as an absolute based on the ideology of donor
control, such assertions provide little insight for resolving the
problems of stale gift restrictions that now seem ill-suited to a
modem charitable environment. Indeed, the early incorporation of
that value set into traditional cy pres doctrine goes far toward
explaining its many failings.163
This is not to say that all donors vacuously impose such
restrictions or do so without considered thought or more personal
reason. There are a number of reasons-donor submotivations, one
might say-that affect the restrictions grouped into this category. A
donor might, for example, impose a naming restriction based on
some personal desire for immortality or wish to be remembered
fondly. A donor might also impose similar restrictions in pursuit of
peer equality, recognition, or simply out of imitation of what others
have done before.""

On the other hand, the basket of restrictions

that fall into this catchall category sometimes arise from nothing
more cogent than a sense of donor entitlement. That entitlement
centers on the legal force accorded such restrictions and the
property-rights view that a donor is entitled to part with her
property upon whatever terms she desires.
For present purposes, however, these observations suggest that
any deeper analysis of this particular category of donor-restriction
motivations would do little to take us beyond the already-noted
ideology of donor control, providing little insight on questions
relating to the management and resolution of restrictive-gift issues.
Such observations also begin to veer too far back toward the
particulars of an individual donor's subjective intentions and away
163. See Comment, supra note 18, at 309-10 ("Another source of confusion
concerning the cy pres doctrine as it was introduced to the American courts lies
in the overemphasis placed upon the effectuation of the donor's intent.... In
orign ... cy pres was employed chiefly with the aim of advancing purposes
believed to be of great social benefit. Gradually, however, this emphasis
changed; judicial cy pres tended more and more to become . . . solely an intentenforcing instrument.").
164. By way of further example, a donation of artwork on condition that it
always be displayed prominently in a particular vestibule of a given museum
might be based on the donor's supposition that only if the artwork remains on
active display will the donor maintain her status as on par with other
community philanthropists. Sometimes, however, such conditions reflect donor
preferences that can be attributed to nothing more than the donor's own
idiosyncratic personality. The classic case of George Bernard Shaw's alphabet
trust provides an example. See Pub. Tr. v. Day (In re Shaw), [19571 1 All E.R.
745 (Ch.) (Eng.). For an analysis of the psychological motivations underlying
certain donor restrictions, see Ronald Chester, The Psychology of Dead Hand
Control, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 505 (2008); Hirsch, supra note 159, at
75-78. Cf John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropyand the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax

Exemption, 36 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 657, 670-79 (2001) (discussing various
theories explaining the existence of "altruism").
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from the more objective and consequential approach proposed here.
Restrictions falling into this final category have little objective
consequence-particularly with regard to promoting charitable
ends-apart from the bare idea that the restrictions limit the
charitable recipient for reasons and in ways that fall outside of the
donor concerns noted in Parts IV through VI. Such restrictions do
not to any meaningful degree force adherence to a given publicpolicy viewpoint, delineate or augment managerial fiduciary duties
in relation to charitable pursuits, or otherwise directly facilitate the
accomplishment of charitable ends.
B.

An Example Revisited

Consider the earlier example involving a hospital and the
treatment of tuberculosis. 6 5 Recall that the donor devised funds to
City Hospital for the establishment and support of a wing to house
and care for tuberculosis patients. Now assume further that the
donor specified that the hospital wing should be named "The Jane
Doe Memorial Treatment Center" after herself. As discussed
previously, the lack of any need for such in-hospital treatment
ultimately resolves itself (under the analysis posited in this Article)
into utilizing the donor's gift for a tuberculosis outpatient center,
with the donor's chosen hospital having the first opportunity to
'
pursue that charitable endeavor. 66
Upon resolution of that core issue, the donor's naming
requirement-or any other restriction of the type contemplated in
this Part and adaptable to that resolution-would receive its due. 67
Most simply, the name can attach to the modified charitable
endeavor in some manner that reflects the donor's associative
demand. Comprehensively viewed, the approach proposed in this
Article thus suggests that addressing these types of donor
restrictions should follow the resolution of issues that now confound
the implementation of the donor's other restrictive terms. The
analysis should first resolve questions about the proper charitable
class and purposes to be served going forward, taking into account
managerial past conduct and prospective plans for employing the
donor's gift as modified. Restrictions that attempt to freeze in place
some rejected notion of public policy can be discarded. The ultimate
resolution would then accommodate naming and other similar
restrictions, consistent with the modified charitable design.
C.

Summary

The

suggested

prioritization

recognizes

that

restrictions

165. See supra Parts I.C., IV.B.
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. Concerning the recognition of donor expressions that remain viable in
the aftermath of cy pres modification of restrictions more central to charitable
purpose, see supra notes 98, 131 and accompanying text.
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categorized in this Part have little to do with the accomplishment of
any charitable purpose, beyond the bare (and generally weak)
premise that the restrictive opportunity may have facilitated the
contribution to charity in the first instance. The restriction itself
promotes only private concerns and should not be accorded the same
weight as a restriction that contributes in some way to the meaning,
pursuit, or accomplishment of charitable objectives. The approach
here posits that such donor mandates should hold only limited
power over the accomplishment of more broadly conceived charitable
ends. Ultimately, that power should be an adaptive one that does
not hold primacy in a reformulated cy pres doctrine or carry the
import of potentially defeating a charitable gift entirely.
CONCLUSION

By abandoning the notion of slavish adherence to a given
donor's subjective intentions, the analysis proposed in this Article
provides a more structured and objective approach to dealing with
donor-restricted gifts and the problems that such gifts often cause.
This approach pays due homage to the foundational "donor intent"
premise that underlies centuries of cy pres development while
avoiding much of the variability wrought by that unsteady
foundation in practical application.
The resulting analytical
framework better serves the modern managerial context in which
restricted charitable gifts are so often put to use. The proposal set
forth here achieves these ideals by asking, from a more general and
categorical point of view, an essential question: why did the donor
impose this restriction?
The four donor motivations identified in this Article underlie a
meaningfully different conception of donor intent.
This view
ultimately derives from the inescapable fact that a donor identified
a charitable purpose, progressively narrowed that purpose via her
gift restrictions, put someone in charge of implementing the gift in
service to that purpose, and then asserted a measure of dead-hand
control with knowledge that consequences flow from that exercise of
donor power. This recasting of donor intent therefore turns not
upon some variable divination of subjective donor thoughts but
rather upon the objective consequences that flow from the
restrictions at issue.
Thus emerges a structure and rationale that should, in contrast
to current doctrine, positively influence managerial conduct toward
honoring donor intent long before gift restrictions become
problematic. The incorporation of past managerial conduct into the
evaluation of proposed cy pres outcomes provides an incentive for
managerial attentiveness to a donor's terms in the ongoing
stewardship of restricted charitable gifts.
The predictability
fostered by this Article's more objective analytical inquiry,
moreover, should embolden management to pursue a favorable gift
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interpretation or modification in an open forum subject to public
scrutiny, as opposed to following the "low road" of possibly usurping
donor restrictions and falling prey to the opportunities for
malfeasance that such a path presents.
Inevitably, circumstances change and human beings find
themselves time and again surprised by the course of what
transpires. Logic therefore dictates that donor attempts to control
the use of gifted property in perpetuity will often eventually conflict
with the accomplishment of charitable objectives. When conflict
does arise, donor intent matters, but such intent should not be
allowed to run roughshod over evolving notions of service to the
public good. Any approach to resolving problematic gift restrictions
should keep such charitable considerations prominent in their own
right and, indeed, primary to all that follow. The approach set forth
in this Article proceeds just so, allowing "charity" to remain always
central to defining the boundaries of what is possible and
permissible by virtue of a donor's generosity.
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